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Cohealth Service Cutoff — Victorian Government Cannot Ignore

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On October 16, Cohealth—one of Australia’s largest community health organizations and a non-profit medical institution—announced it would close three of its clinics. The news immediately sparked widespread public debate and criticism. The affected clinics are located in Collingwood, Fitzroy, and Kensington. The Fitzroy and Kensington clinics will cease general practitioner (GP) and consultation services this December, though they will continue providing specialized support for alcohol, drug, and domestic violence issues. The Collingwood centre is scheduled for full closure next June.

The closures will directly impact approximately 12,500 patients, resulting in 20 doctors losing their jobs and 44 nurses facing reassignment or redundancy. These clinics have long provided vital primary healthcare services to low-income individuals, the homeless, refugees, domestic violence survivors, and those with chronic illnesses, serving as an indispensable health support network within the community. However, due to insufficient funding, rising costs, and operational pressures, these services are now being forced to cease.

Nicole Bartholomeusz, CEO of Cohealth, stated that the cessation of services reflects “multiple and complex pressures, including decades of underinvestment, aging infrastructure, and funding models that don’t match actual needs or the type of care required.” She noted: “The funding we receive is only sufficient to provide standard care, but we actually serve high-need patients who often require extended appointments and comprehensive case management tailored to each individual.”

Cohealth’s current Medicare subsidy only covers physician salaries, failing to account for nurses, receptionists, and other operational costs. As wages and supply costs rise, the annual gap between clinic operating expenses and Medicare funding continues to widen.

 

Reforms Too Late, Support Too Little

In truth, Cohealth’s predicament did not emerge suddenly but resulted from years of accumulated challenges. Although the federal Labor government has pushed Medicare reforms in recent years to enhance the sustainability of the universal healthcare system—such as the upcoming Bulk Billing Practice Incentive Program (BBPIP) launching November 1st, which will expand Medicare coverage, encourage clinics to maintain bulk billing, and provide additional funding for facility upgrades and team expansion— This initiative aims to improve access and affordability of healthcare services, with approximately 4,800 clinics expected to benefit.

However, for Cohealth, this reform appears to have come too late. The root problem lies not solely at the federal level, but in the Victorian government’s long-standing neglect of the actual health needs within grassroots communities. The poverty, homelessness, addiction, and trauma issues plaguing local communities have long exceeded the capacity of standard clinics. Yet the Victorian government has failed to provide additional support or establish stable funding mechanisms to sustain non-for-profit healthcare providers.

Cohealth identifies two primary causes for the current crisis: First, insufficient Medicare funding from the federal government for managing complex patients; Second, the Victorian government has failed to fund upgrades for the aging facilities at the Collingwood clinic.

Cohealth has repeatedly called for government support over the years. As early as 2022, Cohealth issued a statement noting that while they supported the government’s health-focused budget, the community health model—which played a critical role during the pandemic—was once again being overlooked. At that time, Cohealth emphasized the need for comprehensive investment across the entire healthcare sector to strengthen the health system as a whole.

The clinic’s facilities have long been outdated, with roof leaks forcing appointment cancellations. Despite multiple funding applications to authorities over the years, no substantive response has been received. Infrastructure Victoria’s report highlights that government funding for community services is fragmented and inadequate. The federal government has yet to establish dedicated funding for community health infrastructure. Even though the Australian government allocated $117 billion to health and medical services for 2024-25, community health organizations received only 0.3% of Victoria’s annual health infrastructure expenditure of approximately $2 billion.

Amid chronic funding shortages and sluggish government reforms, the state government’s disregard for community needs and inaction ultimately sealed the fate of these clinics. This underscores the state government’s core responsibility in ensuring the continuity of primary healthcare services.

 

Who is accountable for healthcare quality and service delivery?

 

In fact, community healthcare systems did not originate from government initiatives but from charitable and faith-based traditions. Early hospitals were often founded by churches or charitable organizations with a simple mission: to provide basic care to the poor and vulnerable through empathy and compassion. Healthcare then embodied social conscience rather than being a product of policy or systems.

As society modernized and public health concepts emerged, governments gradually assumed responsibility, incorporating health into the realm of “public duty.” The original intent behind this shift was noble—to ensure equal access to healthcare for all. Yet the process of institutionalization and bureaucratization introduced new challenges: the original “people-centred” care became diluted by layers of administrative procedures and economic logic. Healthcare services increasingly emphasized efficiency and output, gradually losing its human warmth.

Non-profit medical institutions like Cohealth represent a continuation of this historical trajectory. They uphold the founding spirit of charitable healthcare—serving vulnerable communities while upholding the belief that everyone deserves the right to health and equal access to medical care. Yet in reality, these organizations rely on government subsidies and unstable funding sources to sustain their operations.

The contradiction lies in the fact that as societies grow wealthier, public healthcare systems should be better equipped to protect the vulnerable. Yet the opposite occurs: medical costs rise relentlessly, resource distribution grows increasingly unequal, and healthcare services become ever more commoditized. In this environment, doctors are forced to complete consultations within “six-minute appointments,” nurses and receptionists operate at breaking point, and patients slip through the cracks of the system, overlooked.

Yet when reflecting on responsibility, the question may extend beyond “Who is to blame?” to “Where should healthcare be headed?”

Should we pursue the endless quest to “cure every disease”? Or should we return to healthcare’s fundamental purpose—ensuring everyone accesses basic health protection?

When the wealthy pay more for faster, better care while the poor endure long queues, has the ideal of equality already been swallowed by market logic?

Take Hong Kong, for instance. As a low-tax society, its citizens enjoy public healthcare at minimal cost—subsidized for life simply by holding a Hong Kong ID card. However, with an aging population and healthcare staff shortages, the public system has been chronically overburdened, leading to months-long waits for emergency rooms and specialist appointments. Consequently, the affluent middle and upper classes turn to private clinics, trading money for efficiency. This creates a healthcare system that appears equitable on the surface but is fundamentally stratified: the government guarantees access to services but not equal speed or quality. In other words, everyone has the right to medical care, but whether you can get better quickly and where you receive treatment depends on how much money you have.

Canada’s public healthcare system, meanwhile, is more idealistic. All residents can access free public healthcare with a health card, free from concerns about high costs. However, long waiting times and uneven resource distribution transform “free” into another form of “cost.” When demand far exceeds supply, fairness and accessibility inevitably clash.

Moreover, should healthcare prioritize “universal access” or ‘quality’? Should governments provide “basic care” or “comprehensive coverage”?

 

Comparisons with China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan

From an international perspective, Australia’s public healthcare system (Medicare) differs significantly from those in mainland China and Taiwan, each with distinct advantages and disadvantages. Mainland China’s system, dominated by public hospitals, subsidizes basic care through social medical insurance (urban employee/resident insurance). However, due to its massive population and concentration of medical resources in major cities, primary community clinics often struggle to handle high-demand patients—particularly low-income groups and those with chronic conditions. This mirrors Cohealth’s current situation: “resource concentration leading to overflowing demand.”

Taiwan adopted a National Health Insurance (NHI) model emphasizing “one health insurance card, nationwide healthcare coverage,” ensuring basic medical services for all regardless of urban/rural location or income level. NHI strengthens primary care clinics through subsidies and incentives, stabilizing the family doctor system. Nevertheless, disparities in healthcare resource distribution between urban and rural areas persist, and wait times for specialist care can remain excessively long.

In contrast, Australia’s Medicare system pursues fairness and accessibility in theory. Yet in practice, non-profit primary care institutions face chronic funding shortages and aging facilities. While serving predominantly vulnerable populations, these clinics often shoulder service volumes exceeding subsidy coverage. This structural contradiction creates a significant gap between the system’s ideals and its actual service capacity, highlighting a common challenge faced by vulnerable groups under different systems: even with “systemic safeguards,” they may still be marginalized due to inadequate resource allocation.

 

Australia’s Core Healthcare Contradiction

Returning to Australia itself, the core issue of its healthcare system isn’t a lack of total funding, but rather structural contradictions arising from resource allocation, institutional design, and policy priorities. Medicare is primarily designed for “standard medical services” such as general consultations, basic tests, and medications. However, it does not provide corresponding subsidies for the time, labour costs, and interdisciplinary integrated care required for high-need or complex patients. This leaves vulnerable groups unable to access truly comprehensive healthcare under the existing system.

Non-profit community clinics like Cohealth exist precisely to fill this gap. They offer extended consultations, case management, mental health counselling, addiction and domestic violence support, and even multidisciplinary integrated programs—services standard GP clinics struggle to provide. However, these intensive services are not fully subsidized by Medicare. Combined with limited state investment in primary care infrastructure, clinics face chronic financial strain, ultimately forcing service reductions or partial closures.

Cohealth’s partial closures reflect a deep-seated contradiction within Australia’s healthcare system: equity and accessibility do not equate to substantive care guarantees for high-need populations. While everyone ostensibly has the right to medical care, those requiring prolonged attention and individualized management often survive only by navigating systemic gaps. The institutional design itself thus creates an “invisible inequity” for high-need patients.

Australia’s healthcare also grapples with the dilemma of balancing universal coverage and quality. On one hand, the system must ensure everyone receives at least basic treatment; on the other, complex patients require sufficient time, specialized support, and case management. In reality, however, insufficient government funding and a narrow subsidy structure make achieving both goals difficult. Doctors are forced to rush through consultations, nurses and receptionists operate at capacity, while vulnerable patients languish on waiting lists. Non-profit clinics like Cohealth strive to fill these gaps, but persistent financial pressures and policy constraints render “humanized healthcare” a luxury in practice.

In other words, the core issue with Australia’s public healthcare system isn’t merely about assigning responsibility, but whether the system can return to its founding principle: ensuring everyone accesses basic healthcare while providing high-need patients with adequate resources and compassionate support when required. Cohealth’s predicament serves as a stark warning: without structural adjustments to resource allocation by government and society, the ideal of fairness remains unattainable, and vulnerable groups will continue to be marginalized by the system.

 

The Victorian Government’s Indisputable Responsibility

While medical policy is set by the federal government, state governments bear responsibility for implementing it according to local realities. Cohealth’s inner-city service area has a population receiving government living subsidies that exceeds the Australian average by more than double, indicating many residents cannot afford private services. The Victorian Government’s refusal to provide financial support to institutions like Cohealth demonstrates a disregard for vulnerable communities.

A similar situation exists in elder care for multicultural communities. While federal funding supports aged care services, research indicates that non-English-speaking seniors benefit most from living in facilities that accommodate their cultural and linguistic backgrounds. Yet, emerging senior communities like the Chinese diaspora receive minimal Victorian government assistance to build suitable aged care facilities. Since 2014, Labor leader Andrews has repeatedly proposed policies to purchase four plots of land for the Chinese and Indian communities to build elderly care facilities. Yet to this day, the Victorian Department of Health continues to leave these sites vacant, failing to hand them over to community organizations to develop services. This demonstrates a dereliction of duty by government officials. This situation bears striking similarities to Cohealth Community Health Services ceasing operations today due to neglect. Should the Victorian Government conduct a thorough review of the Department of Health’s operations?

 

Editorial : Liz Li, Jenny Lun

Photo: Internet

Published in Sameway Magazine  24 October 2025

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Multicultural Aged Care Landbank Policy: Victoria Labor Government Cheated Chinese Voters

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In Victoria, the proportion of overseas-born residents increased from 20.4% in 2006 to 29.9% in 2021, while the proportion of households speaking a language other than English rose from 20.4% to 27%. Consequently, since 2010, both major political parties have actively introduced immigrant-friendly policies to win support from migrant communities. In 2008, Ted Baillieu of the Liberal Party launched a Chinese-language opposition leader column in this publication, successfully gaining significant Chinese votes and becoming Premier in 2010. In 2014, Labor’s Daniel Andrews proposed buying land and leasing it to Chinese and Indian communities for aged care facilities, winning back votes in Victoria’s two largest multicultural communities from the Liberals. Labor has remained in power since then. In 2018, Andrews repeated the strategy, allocating AUD 7.25 million to purchase more land near Mount Dandenong and inviting Chinese community organizations to build additional aged care facilities. However, while the land was purchased, four parcels promised for minority-led aged care projects remain unused and have not been handed over to minority communities.

Since 2014, Labor has pledged to build hundreds of aged care facilities tailored to the language and culture of minority seniors. Yet, over the past 11 years, not a single additional bed has been provided for Victoria’s Chinese or South Asian elders. Meanwhile, the lands originally intended for these facilities have remained vacant, leaving hundreds of non-English-speaking seniors to spend their final years in environments where communication is limited and care is inadequate. The internal problems within the Labor government have gone largely ignored by mainstream media and society.

Multicultural Aged Care Landbank

In recent years, the Victorian government has introduced several policies addressing aged care for multicultural communities, including the “Multicultural Aged Care Landbank” program. On the surface, this policy aims to provide culturally and linguistically appropriate facilities, particularly for Chinese, Indian, and other migrant seniors. However, examining the policy’s development and implementation reveals significant challenges and inequities faced by the Chinese community. Greater vigilance is required in participation, oversight, and safeguarding community interests. This article aims to help Chinese seniors, families, and community organizations in Melbourne better understand the policy and prepare for future aged care needs.

Policy Origins: Promises, Pilots, and Initial Steps (2014–2015)

Ahead of the 2014 Victorian state election, Labor launched a platform including 100,000 new jobs and large-scale infrastructure projects. While education, health, and transport were mentioned, the Multicultural Aged Care Landbank policy did not appear in official campaign documents, suggesting it was a niche election promise rather than a key platform. This low-profile launch left room for future policy adjustments, as there was limited public oversight or a clear definition.

In July 2015, Labor announced an agreement with nonprofit Southern Cross Care to build a 90-bed aged care facility at North Williamstown. Officially part of the Landbank program, this project aimed to address rising inner-city land costs that made it difficult for nonprofit providers to acquire land near the city. Although labeled “multicultural,” it was primarily a general land reserve/support program for nonprofits, not specifically focused on multicultural seniors. This early inconsistency between promise and action foreshadowed the marginalization of the Chinese community.

Policy Evolution: From Landbank to Altered Conditions (2016–2024)

In October 2017, the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) issued a call for expressions of interest (EOI) for aged care facilities in Springvale South targeting the Chinese community. The EOI allowed existing or newly established nonprofit Chinese organizations to apply without being approved as aged care providers, focusing on cultural competence and fundraising capacity. The Chinese Community Council of Australia (Vic Chapter, CCCAV) was selected in October 2018 and paired with experienced provider Doutta Galla, intending to build in Springvale South. While initially seen as a win, CCCAV reportedly failed to raise funds and did not secure the land.

In the 2019–20 state budget, the government purchased a 10,000 m² site at 227 Manningham Road, Templestowe Lower, for over AUD 10 million. A second EOI in 2021 invited Chinese nonprofit organizations to lease the land. However, delays occurred. After CCCAV submitted a complete application in early 2022, Ernst & Young reviewed it, and no decision was made before the 2022 election. In July 2023, after multiple negotiations, the DHHS decided to restart the application process. Delays reportedly increased construction costs by more than AUD 600,000.

By November 2024, a new EOI for four parcels (two for Chinese, two for Indian communities) required applicants to be approved residential aged care providers, excluding many Chinese community organizations like CCCAV, which lacked such status. Currently, Victoria has only three Chinese-language aged care facilities. This shift effectively returned community-led opportunities to mainstream providers, and the EOI was not widely communicated to prior participants, giving them less than four weeks to apply—a clearly unfair process.

From Promise to Marginalization: Community-Led to Provider-Led

Initially, the policy allowed community organizations, particularly Chinese groups, to participate and potentially become aged care providers. By 2024, requiring approved provider status would exclude these organizations, undermining years of preparation. For the Chinese community, this meant that promised land and construction opportunities were reduced, and community-led participation was weakened.

Additionally, the “multicultural” label masked the reality that government resources and processes favored large mainstream providers. According to the Ethnic Communities’ Council of Victoria (ECCV) 2018 report, over 30% of seniors in Victoria aged 65+ come from non-English-speaking backgrounds, often facing disadvantages in care services.

Shifting from community-led to provider-led reduces culturally and linguistically appropriate care opportunities, forcing Chinese seniors to accept services with less cultural sensitivity. Procedural opacity and tight timelines disproportionately exclude resource-limited organizations, widening the trust gap between the community and government.

Chinese Communities Can No Longer Remain Bystanders

Over the years, the government has conveyed promises to immigrant communities through the Landbank program: appropriate facilities, cultural and language services, and community-led development. Yet, the experience of the Chinese community reveals the risk of “overpromising”: communities invited to participate were ultimately excluded by large providers, land commitments remained unfulfilled, and processes were opaque and frequently changed. As a result, policies that should have been implemented remain largely theoretical.

For Melbourne’s Chinese community, this is not just policy analysis but a practical issue affecting elder care and community welfare. Families and organizations must actively participate, plan, monitor processes, and advocate for culturally sensitive care to ensure seniors receive truly appropriate services.

A deeper issue is that Labor’s superficially sincere policy clearly misled minority communities and won their votes in the 2014, 2018, and 2022 elections. In the 2022 election, our publication asked Premier Andrews why he had broken trust with the Chinese community. He arrogantly responded, “The land was purchased; it’s your Chinese community that refused it, not the government’s failure.”

I replied, “The land in question, located in Springvale South and now a 10,000 m² site in Templestowe Lower, was allocated to the Chinese Community Council of Australia (Vic Chapter), founded by retired Labor MP Lin Meifeng in 2018. With AUD 7.25 million funding from the 2019 federal Liberal government, any Chinese community organization could have built on it.”

However, over the past three years, facing fiscal strain and huge debt, the Victorian Labor government has not prioritized assisting Chinese community organizations. The Victorian Liberals, weakened internally, are unable to supervise the government. With the rise of independent MPs at the federal level since 2022, the next state election may see independent minority candidates raise this agenda, forcing major parties to confront it.

It is now time for multicultural communities to speak up and compel the Victorian government to address its long-term neglect of minority elders.

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Silence is Complicity; Vigilance is the Weapon

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Introduction: The Collapse of a $14 Billion Empire and Global Silence

In October 2025, a U.S. arrest warrant sent shockwaves through Southeast Asia’s financial circles. The U.S. Department of Justice, in cooperation with UK law enforcement, issued a global arrest notice for Chen Zhi, founder of Cambodia’s Prince Holding Group. He is accused of orchestrating the world’s largest cryptocurrency money-laundering operation and running a scam network in Cambodia, involving as much as $14 billion. Once celebrated as the “2021 Entrepreneur of the Year” and a “2024 Global Economic Leader,” Chen is now labeled an international crime lord.

On the surface, Prince Holding Group is a real estate developer, financial services provider, and customer support operator. In reality, it runs multiple forced-labor scam “parks” in Sihanoukville, Phnom Penh, and elsewhere. Victims are lured through fake job advertisements; upon arrival, passports are confiscated, and they are subjected to electric shocks, starvation, sexual assault, and forced daily “pig-butchering” scams—gaining trust via dating apps before persuading victims to invest in virtual currency platforms, ultimately draining their savings. The funds are laundered through offshore companies, crypto wallets, and financial hubs in Singapore and Dubai, then funneled back into Cambodian real estate, blending illicit capital with legitimate business.

The U.S. has frozen Chen’s assets and issued a red notice, but he remains at large. More strikingly, despite Chen holding two publicly listed companies in Hong Kong and serving as chairman, the Hong Kong government has taken no action, neither suspending stock trading, freezing assets, issuing warrants, nor investigating his companies. Chinese state media have remained silent. This is not just a corporate collapse, but a national-level laundering saga implicating tacit approval from Chinese political leaders, Cambodian political-business collusion, and global regulatory gaps.

The Infamous Rise: From Fuzhou Internet Café to Cambodia’s “Scam Tsar”

Born in 1987 in Fujian, China, Chen started from a small internet café in Fuzhou. In 2015, he moved to Cambodia under an investment immigration scheme and founded Prince Holding Group. Within ten years, he built a sprawling empire across real estate, finance, and gambling, earning awards and forging deep ties with Cambodia’s elite.

By 2020–2022, Thai and Cambodian authorities had already flagged his employees for illegal online gambling and money laundering. A 2025 joint investigation by U.S., Thai, and Cambodian authorities revealed the full scope: Cambodian “scam parks” exploited Chinese, Vietnamese, and Indian laborers, deceived by fake job ads into modern slavery. The scams were meticulous: victims were “fattened” via dating apps, then enticed to invest in virtual currencies. Money flowed through offshore companies, cryptocurrency wallets, and financial centers in Singapore and Dubai, and then back to Cambodian real estate. This combination of crime and business is the core of Chen’s empire—appearing as developers while operating the world’s largest laundering machine, distorting Cambodia’s economy, inflating housing prices, fueling corruption, and exporting financial risk globally.

Qian Zhimin vs. Chen Zhi: Pure Commercial Fraud vs. State-Level Crime Network

Another crypto scam giant, Qian Zhimin (“Bitcoin Queen”), provides a sharp contrast. She founded Blue Sky Germanium Electronic Tech in 2014, promoting high-yield investment schemes and fictitious Bitcoin mining operations, often posing as a philanthropist or person with disabilities. She pleaded guilty in the UK in September 2025; investigations found her holding over £5 billion in Bitcoin. Unlike Chen, Qian’s schemes were purely commercial fraud, relying on psychological manipulation and Ponzi structures. Chen’s operations, in contrast, involve international relations, Chinese influence in Cambodia, political protection, and border laxity—far beyond individual capacity.

The Chinese Factor: Hong Kong Silence = State Approval?
Despite being a top U.S. fugitive, Hong Kong police have not acted. Prince Holding maintains multiple shell companies in Hong Kong for fund transfers. Chen publicly praised the Belt and Road Initiative, with his Cambodian projects receiving low-interest loans from Chinese banks, and the Chinese embassy in Cambodia repeatedly endorsed him as a “model of China-Cambodia friendship.” Chen’s core influence is in Cambodia, but his protection stems from China. Hong Kong’s inaction is effectively a national-level cover, allowing him to operate under international pursuit.

Palau Gambit: Hotel Investment as United Front Strategy

Since 2023, Prince Holding has expanded into Palau, pledging $120 million for a five-star resort and casino, promising 800 jobs and infrastructure upgrades. While appearing as typical Belt and Road development aid, the project carries geopolitical motives. Palau, one of only 12 nations with formal diplomatic ties to Taiwan, has resisted Beijing’s “checkbook diplomacy.” Chen’s resort is located on the main island near the presidential palace and parliament, including a “China-only conference center” and direct flights to Phnom Penh. Local opposition claims the project aims to soften Palau’s stance toward Taiwan, creating pro-China factions via economic incentives.

Evidence suggests Chen may act as a Chinese United Front agent:

  • His Palau project received low-interest loans from China’s Exim Bank, 40% below market rate. 
  • In 2024, Palau’s President publicly criticized the project as a “threat to sovereignty,” met only with a “regretful” response from China’s foreign ministry. 
  • Shell companies registered in Palau trace back to Hong Kong directors with Chinese capital. 

Under united front logic, Chen is not a mere “scammer” but a “usable pawn.” His Cambodian pig-butchering and laundering activities are deemed an acceptable cost for expanding Beijing’s influence in the Pacific. This explains China’s silence or tacit support for his evasion.

The Global Media Vacuum: Silence as Position

Chinese media have completely blocked coverage, hiding political links; Cambodian local reporting is muted, praising Chen to avoid political retaliation; Thai reports are sparse, fearing impacts on tourism and Chinese investment; UK and U.S. media pursue high-profile prosecutions with jurisdiction over victims. Media silence across nations aligns with state interests and diplomatic pressures, reflecting not incapacity but deliberate positioning.

Australia’s Structural Blind Spot: Systemic Ignorance of Asian Corruption

Mainstream Australian media (ABC, The Australian, SBS, 9News) have barely reported on Chen, mostly through second-hand sources. This is a systemic issue:

  • Geographic and psychological distance make Southeast Asia seem remote; editors prioritize domestic politics, climate, and sand ports. 
  • Professional capacity is limited: crypto laundering, offshore companies, and human rights investigations require cross-disciplinary expertise, scarce in Australian media. 
  • Cultural bias: Australia’s public sees developed nations as “normal” and Asian corruption as “typical for developing countries,” ignoring global ripple effects. Chen’s network has reached Australia: dozens of citizens became pig-butchering victims; Prince Holding has shell companies in Sydney and Melbourne; Australian superannuation may indirectly invest in his real estate. 
  • Commercial and political sensitivities exacerbate silence: reporting risks offending Chinese firms or being labeled “anti-China.” 

Media silence reflects structural ignorance of Asian political-business corruption and creates national security risks. Without media warnings, investors, policymakers, and law enforcement operate in an information vacuum.

The Mirage of Prosperity and Moral Decay: Wealth as Power

Chen’s case exemplifies China’s “wealth as power” strategy. Prince Holding builds schools and hospitals to secure development rights and political favors. Beneath philanthropy lies a grey capital cycle: fraud → laundering → real estate → political donations → protection.

With expanded U.S. and UK sanctions, Cambodia’s “investment paradise” image collapses, and regional countries quietly distance themselves. Crypto anonymity, cross-border payments, weak Southeast Asian regulation, and lax Chinese capital outflow controls create technical loopholes. Psychological and cultural vulnerabilities—greed, blind trust in authority, collectivist pressures—aid scammers.

Scammers sell not just wealth but social recognition: luxury cars, trophies, media exposure, celebrity photos, creating a “prosperity illusion” that lures victims. Lack of reporting results in personal financial losses, trauma, loss of trust in media and regulation, limited regulatory reform, hindered intelligence sharing, criminal expansion, asset bubbles, and threats to global financial stability. Australia’s continued silence risks becoming the next laundering hub.

Solutions: Media, Policy, and Public Action

Australia should:

  • Establish a “Cross-Border Scam Investigation Fund” and collaborate with Southeast Asian independent media. 
  • Launch “Red Flag Alerts” for high-risk investments. 
  • Require Chinese-funded projects to disclose sources, strengthen AFCA handling of crypto scams, and share intelligence with the FBI. 
  • The public should learn to spot investment red flags (high returns, guaranteed principal, urgency), use ASIC tools, and report suspicious groups. 

Whistleblower protection and transnational investigations are crucial—only with intelligence circulation can criminal networks be exposed.

Chen Zhi is not the endpoint but a warning. When criminal capital masquerades as legitimate investment, state power becomes a scam backstop, and the media collectively remain silent, the global financial system’s defenses collapse. Australia can no longer console itself with “this is an Asian issue.” The next Chen may already be registering a company in a Sydney office.

“Money Makes the Devil Grind” is no metaphor; it is Southeast Asia’s harshest business reality. Only through responsible media, restrictive policy, and public vigilance can this national-level money-laundering drama end.

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Can history be truly judged by the public?

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Over the past few weeks, I have participated in several events commemorating the 80th anniversary of the War of Resistance Against Japan. These events made me reflect: Is it really true that history will be ultimately judged by the public?

Earlier this year, Mr. Bill Lau of the Chinese Youth Society of Melbourne (CYSM), a well-known leader in the overseas Chinese community, discussed with me how to organize activities for the 80th anniversary. At the time, I pointed out that the current global situation—amid the Russia-Ukraine and Israel-Hamas wars—bears some resemblance to the early political landscape of the Second Sino-Japanese War. In commemorating the 80th anniversary, we should draw hope and direction from history for the present world, rather than falling into the old argument over whether the Kuomintang (KMT) or the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) led the resistance against Japan.

During a cultural performance in early October, over a hundred members of the CYSM staged an all-inclusive performance that began with the late Qing Dynasty’s humiliation by foreign powers and led into Sun Yat-sen’s founding of the Republic of China, emphasizing the ideal of saving the Chinese nation by overthrowing the Manchu government. The Japanese invasion was portrayed as a wound inflicted upon a still-unstable, newly established China. At the same venue, a bilingual (Chinese-English) historical photo exhibition and special publication introduced today’s younger generation to the Chinese people’s unwavering resistance. These also highlighted how Chiang Kai-shek’s government, during the 8-year war of resistance, tied down Japanese forces and hindered their participation in the European war front.

Although the People’s Republic of China today also commemorates the 80th anniversary of the victory over Japan, the historical reality is that the Communist forces only began to gain a dominant position in China after World War II. Overemphasizing the CCP’s leadership role in the war does not align with historical facts. Eighty years after the war ended, we now see regimes rewriting this chapter of history. Moreover, portraying Japan—which now has no military power—as a continuing threat under militarism is inconsistent with the current reality.

In ongoing conflicts like the Russia-Ukraine war or the temporarily paused Israel-Hamas war, news reports show us that different countries interpret events in vastly different ways. This reminds us that today’s media must uphold professionalism, fairness, and courage in reporting the truth, so that future generations can accurately understand the reality of these wars.

Since ancient times, China has relied on official records to document major events. After a dynasty falls, historians of the next regime compile the previous dynasty’s history. The accuracy of such records depends on whether there were historians like those praised in Wen Tianxiang’s “Song of Righteousness,” who insisted on truth in the face of power—like the scribes of Qi and the historian Dong Hu of Jin. Clearly, under the autocratic rule of Qin Shi Huang, few such historians remained. Throughout Chinese history, official historians have always remembered the tragic consequences of “literary inquisitions” — countless lives lost and voices silenced. Therefore, while China has official histories, these records do not necessarily reflect historical truth.

As we commemorate the 80th anniversary of the War of Resistance today, we are still able to hear anti-Japanese stories passed down from our parents’ generation or infer the atmosphere of the time from films, novels, and written accounts. However, as time goes on, uncovering the truth of history becomes more difficult. As a media professional, I especially treasure the opportunity we have today to report and comment on current affairs with objectivity.

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