On the 12th, China announced a “10-point policy package on Taiwan,” covering areas including trade and economy, transport, youth exchanges, and regional cooperation.
The measures include establishing a youth exchange mechanism between the Communist Party of China and the Kuomintang, promoting the “four links” between Kinmen and Matsu and Fujian/Xiamen (water, electricity, gas, and bridges), resuming pilot programmes for independent travel by residents of Shanghai and Fujian to Taiwan, fully restoring normal cross-strait direct flights, and supporting Taiwanese small and medium-sized enterprises in accessing the mainland market. Some of the measures are seen as the reinstatement of previously implemented policies that were suspended due to heightened cross-strait tensions.
Prior to the announcement, Chinese President Xi Jinping met with Kuomintang Chairperson Cheng Li-wen in Beijing, stressing that “China’s territory cannot be divided” and that cross-strait relations should be “decided by Chinese people themselves.”
Taiwanese scholars noted that more than half of the measures appear to be repackaged versions of earlier policies. They also argued that the economic and exchange initiatives show signs of “policy instrumentalisation,” in which economic and social engagement is used to influence political attitudes and identity issues. In particular, proposals involving shared use of Xiamen’s new airport by Kinmen and Matsu, and enhanced regional connectivity, were said to raise concerns over airspace management, flight safety, and the median line of the Taiwan Strait, requiring government-to-government negotiations.
Taiwan’s ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) criticised the measures as posing risks to sovereignty and national security, stressing that exchanges between the KMT and the CCP do not represent the position of the Taiwanese government. The DPP also pointed out that China has previously restricted imports of Taiwanese agricultural and fishery products under various pretexts such as quarantine measures, arguing that Taiwan has since diversified its export markets and is no longer reliant on a single market.
Commentary:
This policy package continues China’s long-standing dual-track approach toward Taiwan, combining pressure and inducement. Its core objective is not merely short-term policy adjustment, but a longer-term construction of political influence. On one hand, Beijing maintains sustained external pressure through military presence, air and naval patrols, and diplomatic leverage, keeping Taiwan under continuous strategic constraint in terms of security and international space.
On the other hand, it pursues a more subtle and lower-conflict strategy of inducement and engagement. Through trade incentives, local cooperation, infrastructure connectivity, and targeted youth and cultural exchange programmes, it encourages parts of society to view cross-strait interaction as pragmatic economic exchange rather than a sovereignty dispute. In doing so, it seeks to lower the perceived cost of confrontation, shape public perceptions of cross-strait relations and identity, and gradually influence Taiwan’s domestic political climate.