China–US Summit: Searching for a Manageable Relationship Amid Rivalry

On May 14, US President Donald Trump began his first state visit to China since 2017, holding a leaders’ meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing.

At a time when China–US relations remain strained over tariff disputes, artificial intelligence competition, tensions across the Taiwan issue, and broader geopolitical rivalry, the “Xi–Trump summit” drew global attention from the moment it was announced. Observers were especially focused on whether Beijing and Washington would send any new political signals regarding the sensitive Taiwan issue.

In the end, however, the summit produced few concrete breakthroughs and limited substantive outcomes. Yet compared with the increasingly confrontational tone that has defined China–US interactions in recent years, the dialogue and interactions between Trump and Xi nevertheless suggested that both sides are still attempting to maintain a relationship that is “manageable rather than uncontrollable” despite their intense competition.

A Meeting Marked by Mutual Gestures of Goodwill

Both sides deliberately cultivated a friendly diplomatic atmosphere during the visit.

When Trump arrived in Beijing, Chinese Vice President Han Zheng personally greeted him at the airport, a gesture widely interpreted as a high-level welcome from Beijing.

After the talks, Xi accompanied Trump on a visit to the Temple of Heaven, making Trump only the second sitting US president to visit the site after President Gerald Ford in 1975. As an imperial ceremonial complex reserved for Ming and Qing emperors, the Temple of Heaven visit was viewed by many as Beijing’s attempt to accommodate Trump’s appreciation for symbolism and personal diplomacy, thereby creating a warmer atmosphere.

The Temple of Heaven also symbolizes the traditional Chinese concept of harmony between heaven and humanity, as well as the ancient worldview of cosmic balance and coexistence. Beijing’s arrangement for Trump to visit the site was therefore interpreted as a cultural signal that China and the United States need to seek a new balance and framework within the existing international order, maintaining stability and coexistence amid competition.

Trump’s overall demeanor during the visit also appeared relatively restrained. His interactions with Xi were notably polite and cooperative. At the start of the meeting, Trump described Xi as “a great leader” and said it was an honor to meet him. During the state banquet, he unusually followed prepared remarks while reflecting on the history of China–US relations, rather than relying on his typical improvisational style.

Of course, with multiple international crises intersecting — including tensions surrounding Iran — Trump’s primary objective during the trip was negotiation. As a result, he appeared more inclined to cultivate a stable and friendly atmosphere in hopes of creating greater room for bilateral bargaining. At the same time, China’s high-profile reception seemed to encourage Trump to adopt a comparatively pragmatic and restrained posture on certain issues, temporarily lowering the intensity of direct public confrontation and establishing a limited sense of stability and trust amid strategic rivalry.

Beijing Draws a Red Line on Taiwan

On the Taiwan issue — the topic most closely watched by outside observers — the summit did not reveal any significant breakthrough. However, Xi Jinping’s remarks on Taiwan were noticeably tougher than in previous meetings with US leaders.

During the talks, Xi again described Taiwan as the “most important and sensitive core issue” in China–US relations, warning that if handled properly, bilateral ties could remain stable, but if mishandled, they could lead to “collision or even conflict,” potentially pushing relations into “an extremely dangerous situation.” He also reiterated that “Taiwan independence” and peace across the Taiwan Strait are fundamentally incompatible.

Compared with Xi’s language in previous meetings with American presidents, his tone this time was significantly stronger. Terms such as “collision” and “conflict” stood out sharply in what was otherwise a highly formal and friendly diplomatic setting. This was not merely a routine restatement of Beijing’s position, but rather appeared to be a formal red line directed at the Trump administration: if China and the United States hope to establish what they call a “strategically stable relationship,” the Taiwan issue will remain unavoidable at its core.

On the American side, Trump deliberately avoided directly addressing Taiwan during the visit, while the White House summary released afterward made no mention of the topic. Secretary of State Marco Rubio later stated that US policy toward Taiwan “has not changed,” emphasizing that although China raised the issue, it was not the central focus of the meeting.

However, Trump later told Fox News that he did not want to see Taiwan declare independence and believed Beijing could generally accept maintaining the status quo. Although the remarks did not alter official US policy, they were nevertheless interpreted by some as a warning to pro-independence forces in Taiwan, signaling that the Trump administration does not wish to enter into direct military conflict with China over the issue.

In addition, aboard Air Force One on the return flight, Trump acknowledged that he and Xi had discussed arms sales to Taiwan, saying they “might approve them, or might not.” Merely admitting publicly that Taiwan arms sales had been discussed with Beijing sparked controversy in both the United States and Taiwan, because under America’s “Six Assurances” to Taiwan, Washington is not supposed to consult Beijing in advance regarding such decisions.

As a result, Taiwan remains one of the most sensitive and difficult issues in China–US relations, with little likelihood of near-term consensus. The coming months may prove critical in shaping the future direction of bilateral interactions. If Washington exercises restraint in military support and official exchanges with Taiwan, Beijing may interpret this as a goodwill gesture toward stabilizing relations. But if US–Taiwan interactions intensify further, the temporary easing atmosphere created after this summit could quickly collapse back into tension.

Consensus on Iran?

Compared with the Taiwan issue, the White House devoted considerably more attention in its post-summit summary to Iran.

According to the US side, both countries agreed that the Strait of Hormuz must remain open to ensure the free flow of global energy supplies. Xi also reportedly expressed opposition to militarizing the waterway or imposing fees on shipping passage. The White House further stated that China intended to increase purchases of American oil to reduce dependence on the route, and that both sides agreed that “Iran cannot possess nuclear weapons.”

Trump later revealed in an interview that Xi had assured him China would not provide military equipment to Iran. This suggested that Trump succeeded in obtaining at least some degree of Chinese cooperation and political signaling on Iran — one of the few tangible diplomatic gains of the trip.

However, compared with the White House version, China’s official readout mentioned the Middle East only briefly, stating simply that the two sides exchanged views on regional issues without disclosing details.

Limited Economic Achievements

Before the visit, many had expected more significant progress on economic cooperation, especially since Trump traveled with 17 American business leaders, including Elon Musk, Jensen Huang, Tim Cook, and Kelly Ortberg. This raised expectations in financial markets, yet the actual economic outcomes remained limited.

In agriculture, China had earlier extended export permits for more than 600 American slaughterhouses through 2029, which was seen as a goodwill gesture. However, restrictions were later reimposed on parts of the list, and permits do not necessarily translate into actual purchases, leaving uncertainty about practical progress. Beef exports themselves also remain relatively limited in scale.

Regarding soybeans, China had already committed under the “Busan Agreement” framework to purchasing roughly 25 million tonnes annually between 2026 and 2028. No additional commitments were announced during this visit, making the arrangement more of a continuation than a breakthrough.

On aviation, Trump claimed China had agreed to purchase 200 Boeing aircraft, though this fell below earlier expectations of between 300 and 500 planes. Meanwhile, China’s new Boeing orders have declined in recent years as the country increasingly turns toward Airbus, suggesting deeper structural changes remain underway.

In trade, both sides floated preliminary concepts such as lowering tariffs on certain non-sensitive goods or creating mechanisms allowing some Chinese investments to bypass US foreign investment reviews through CFIUS. However, these discussions remained conceptual and did not produce concrete agreements or timelines.

There was likewise no breakthrough on technology and semiconductors. Although reports briefly emerged suggesting the US might ease export restrictions on Nvidia H200 chips, no clear progress materialized, and Washington emphasized that export controls were not a central topic of the summit.

Overall, while the summit emphasized “cooperation progress” at the narrative level, most outcomes amounted to extensions of existing arrangements or symbolic gestures rather than major substantive breakthroughs.

The “Thucydides Trap”: Can China and the US Avoid Great-Power Conflict?

More than the summit’s tangible outcomes, outside observers focused on Xi Jinping once again invoking the concept of the “Thucydides Trap.”

Speaking at the Great Hall of the People, Xi said the world was undergoing “accelerated changes unseen in a century,” and that China and the United States must think together about how to “transcend the Thucydides Trap.” He argued that a rising power and an established power are not inevitably destined for conflict, and that both countries should stabilize bilateral relations while jointly addressing global challenges.

Xi further stressed that China and the United States share more common interests than differences, and that each country’s success can also represent an opportunity for the other. He proposed that the two nations should “create a new model of major-power relations” and jointly complete what he called the “answer sheet of our era.”

The “Thucydides Trap” originates from the ancient Greek historian Thucydides and his account of the Peloponnesian War. At the time, Athens rapidly expanded its economic, military, and naval power, causing fear and anxiety in Sparta, the existing dominant power, ultimately leading to nearly three decades of war. Later, Graham Allison of Harvard University used the concept to describe how a rapidly rising power challenging an established hegemon often creates structural tensions and risks of conflict. In contemporary international politics, the phrase is frequently used to characterize China–US relations.

The core of the “Thucydides Trap” may not simply be war itself, but rather the fear experienced by an established hegemon toward a rising challenger. In today’s China–US relationship, this anxiety can be seen in America’s unease regarding China’s rise. That fear itself may gradually push both sides toward confrontation, with potentially catastrophic consequences.

Xi’s renewed reference to the “Thucydides Trap” therefore appeared to carry a dual message: first, that China now sees itself as a power capable of standing on equal footing with the United States; and second, that although China seeks to reshape its place within the international order, it does not wish for China and the United States to descend into total confrontation or a zero-sum struggle.

The Real Trap Behind the “Thucydides Trap”

Yet perhaps the most important warning contained in the “Thucydides Trap” is not war itself, but how such rivalries historically end.

In the Peloponnesian War, even though Sparta eventually defeated Athens, it failed to establish a lasting and stable hegemony. Prolonged internal exhaustion and warfare weakened the entire Greek world, which was later conquered by the rising Kingdom of Macedon. In other words, when great-power rivalry spirals out of control, the outcome may not be a true victory for either side, but rather mutual weakening that ultimately allows a third force to rise.

Chinese history contains similar examples. After years of warfare, the Northern Song dynasty and the Liao dynasty signed the Chanyuan Treaty, creating a kind of balance between equals: the Song possessed strong economic and cultural influence, while the Liao maintained military and cavalry superiority. Although both sides remained wary of each other, they also sustained a long period of peace and trade.

Yet the force that ultimately reshaped the region was neither Song nor Liao, but the rise of the Jin dynasty. The Jin first destroyed the Liao and then defeated the Northern Song. Later, after years of rivalry between the Jin and the Southern Song, both were ultimately swallowed by the even more powerful Mongol Empire.

Viewed through today’s geopolitical landscape, these historical parallels become especially thought-provoking. The United States faces mounting strategic and resource pressures from tensions surrounding Iran, while continuing to respond to the Russia–Ukraine war and the evolving Indo-Pacific security environment. China, meanwhile, remains highly focused on Taiwan and the South China Sea while expanding its influence through economic development and technological competition, sustaining an ongoing strategic rivalry with Washington.

As both powers devote vast resources to multiple fronts simultaneously, observers are beginning to ask whether prolonged China–US confrontation and exhaustion could eventually create space for another emerging force to reshape the global order between them.

Trump: “This Is the G2”

Returning to China for the first time in nine years, Trump’s visit attracted significant diplomatic attention, and he repeatedly emphasized its achievements. Yet compared with the past, the international environment and the structure of China–US relations have changed substantially. As China’s influence in the global economy and geopolitics continues to rise, bilateral relations increasingly display structural characteristics of simultaneous competition and engagement.

In interviews, Trump again referred to the “G2” framework, reflecting his apparent recognition of China and the United States as two co-equal superpowers dominating the global order.

Overall, while the Beijing trip lacked major substantive breakthroughs, the carefully managed atmosphere of stability and restraint established during the visit may nevertheless have created a more controllable tone for future relations. China–US interactions are expected to remain intensive throughout the year, including a planned White House return visit by Xi and his wife on September 24, the APEC summit in Shenzhen in November, and the G20 summit in Miami in December.

As these diplomatic engagements unfold, the future trajectory of China–US relations will continue to command global attention.