On 6 July, a Chinese People’s Liberation Army Navy strategic nuclear submarine successfully test-fired a submarine-launched ballistic missile capable of carrying a nuclear warhead into international waters of the Pacific Ocean. The missile travelled across the Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) of several Pacific island countries before landing in waters near Tuvalu. Although China described the launch as a “routine training exercise”, Australia, New Zealand and several Indo-Pacific countries criticised the incident as a “provocative action that undermines regional stability”.
Coincidentally, on the same day as the missile test, Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese was beginning a three-day Pacific visit, during which he sought to strengthen defence, policing and economic cooperation with Fiji and other Pacific island nations. Australia not only signed the “Vuvale Union” with Fiji, which includes mutual defence commitments, but also signed the “Nakamal Agreement” with Vanuatu last month, further consolidating Australia’s role as a major security and aid partner in the region.
One side was China demonstrating its military projection capabilities across thousands of kilometres, while the other was Australia accelerating efforts to strengthen ties with Pacific island countries. Although these two events appear separate, they reflect an intensifying geopolitical competition. For Australia, the concern is not only the missile itself, but China’s growing influence in the Pacific through infrastructure investment, diplomacy, policing cooperation and security agreements, which is gradually challenging the security structure Australia has long regarded as its “strategic backyard”.
Australia No Longer Has a “Natural Security Distance”
For decades, Australia’s greatest defence advantage was not military strength, but geography.
Surrounded by oceans and located thousands of kilometres away from major powers, Australia also benefited from a natural buffer formed by Pacific island countries including Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, Fiji and Vanuatu to the north. This meant Australia faced few direct military threats to its mainland in the decades after World War II. Therefore, the idea that “distance equals security” has long been a key foundation of Australia’s defence strategy.
However, as China has continued to pursue military modernisation in recent years, this sense of security based on geography is gradually weakening.
Although the Chinese missile test was still some distance away from mainland Australia, the real concern for the Australian government is not where the missile landed, but the long-range military projection capability China demonstrated. Submarines have high levels of stealth, and their ability to launch long-range ballistic missiles indicates that China is gradually developing a more complete sea-based nuclear deterrence capability. It also shows that Chinese military power can now extend further across the Indo-Pacific region.
The Lowy Institute has also noted in its latest reports that as China continues to develop long-range bombers, ballistic missiles, nuclear submarines and long-endurance drones, Australia’s “natural security barrier” based on geographic distance is gradually disappearing. The report argues that over the next decade, China may not only be capable of threatening Australia through naval power, cyberattacks, disruption of undersea cables and interference with maritime trade, but may also develop the ability to directly strike Australian territory. If Beijing establishes military bases in the Pacific or deploys longer-range weapon systems in the future, major Australian ports, airports, energy facilities and transport infrastructure could potentially become targets.
Therefore, Australia’s heightened concern over the missile test is not because it believes China is about to attack Australia, but because the incident serves as a warning: the security advantage created by geographic distance is gradually shrinking. As China’s military projection capabilities continue to grow, combined with its expanding relationships with Pacific island countries, Australia must rethink how it maintains its strategic advantage in the South Pacific.
From “Strategic Neglect” to Re-engaging Pacific Island Countries
However, Australia’s real challenge is not only China’s growing military capability, but also its previous misjudgment of China’s expansion in the Pacific.
For a long time, Australia viewed Pacific island countries as its “strategic backyard”, but due to economic considerations, it adopted a cautious approach towards China’s increasing influence in the region, and at times underestimated the significance of these developments. Particularly over the past decade, China expanded its relationships with multiple Pacific island countries through the Belt and Road Initiative, infrastructure investment, foreign aid and people-to-people exchanges. Meanwhile, Australia remained more focused on trade cooperation with China and did not immediately view these developments as a security challenge.
It was only in recent years, as China’s role in the Pacific became increasingly visible, that Australia began adjusting its approach. In 2022, Solomon Islands signed a security agreement with China, allowing cooperation in policing and security areas, which raised significant concerns in Australia. The Australian government feared that Beijing could gradually establish a deeper strategic presence through what appeared to be economic and public security cooperation, potentially paving the way for future military deployments.
Against this background, the Albanese government has actively repositioned Australia’s Pacific policy by signing a series of strategically significant agreements with island nations to strengthen bilateral relations.
The recently signed Vuvale Union with Fiji represents an important step in Australia’s effort to enhance regional security cooperation. The agreement is not merely a standard diplomatic partnership, but includes a rare mutual defence commitment, requiring both sides to respond when either party faces security threats. It is Fiji’s first formal defence arrangement with another country and makes Fiji Australia’s fourth formal defence partner after the United States, New Zealand and Papua New Guinea. The agreement also includes an “open clause” allowing other Pacific island countries to join in the future, reflecting Australia’s efforts to expand its regional security network and balance China’s influence.
Beyond security cooperation, Australia is also strengthening ties through economic assistance. The Vuvale Union covers cooperation in climate change, economic development and infrastructure, with Australia committing A$1 billion over the next decade to support Fiji.
Similarly, Australia signed the Nakamal Agreement with Vanuatu last month, establishing Australia as a major aid provider and policing partner for the country. The Albanese government hopes to rebuild Australia’s influence in the South Pacific through security training, infrastructure investment and economic support.
Pacific Island Countries Are Not Choosing Only One Side: China’s Influence Is Reshaping Regional Security
However, while Australia strengthens cooperation with Pacific island countries, it must also recognise a reality: these nations are not simply aligned with Australia, but maintain different levels of cooperation with China based on their own interests.
Facing long-term challenges including climate change, limited infrastructure and economic development needs, many Pacific island countries require external funding and assistance. This has created opportunities for China to expand its economic and diplomatic influence. For Beijing, Pacific island countries are not only development partners but also part of its efforts to challenge existing US influence in the region and break through the island chain strategy. For Australia, China’s deeper engagement with these countries is gradually changing a Pacific security order traditionally dominated by Australia.
In recent years, China has not only strengthened ties through infrastructure investment and economic assistance, but has also expanded cooperation into policing and security fields. Beijing has provided multiple countries with law enforcement equipment, including drones, patrol boats and police vehicles, while strengthening police exchanges with Pacific island nations. Solomon Islands has become the most closely watched example. In 2022, Solomon Islands signed a security cooperation agreement with China, the details of which have not been fully disclosed, raising concerns in Australia and other Western countries that Beijing could establish a deeper security presence.
Following the agreement, Chinese police personnel entered Solomon Islands to provide support including firearms training, riot control tactics and policing training. China has also provided similar cooperation to other Pacific nations through personnel exchanges, equipment assistance and policing programmes. Although Beijing insists such cooperation is mainly aimed at maintaining public security, policing cooperation could become an entry point for expanding China’s security influence and further weakening Australia’s traditional role in the region.
China’s Pacific strategy is not limited to security. Over many years, Beijing has used Belt and Road-related investments and aid to build roads, stadiums, government buildings and hospitals across several island countries, gradually establishing economic and political connections. For some Pacific island nations with small populations and limited resources, Chinese funding and development projects are attractive and provide more diplomatic options.
Therefore, Pacific island countries are not simply choosing between Australia and China. Many seek to maintain security cooperation with Australia while preserving economic ties with China, balancing different powers to maximise their own interests. For example, even after signing the Nakamal Agreement with Australia last month, Vanuatu stated that it was still waiting for Beijing’s approval of another development cooperation agreement, showing that some island nations wish to retain space for cooperation with China despite receiving Australian security support.
This diplomatic balancing strategy creates greater challenges for Australia. Even if Australia views China as its main strategic competitor, neighbouring island countries may not share the same position. The real risk for Australia is not simply that Pacific island countries maintain diplomatic relations with China, but whether Beijing can gradually establish a strategic presence through long-term economic dependence, security cooperation and political influence. If China builds deeper security networks in Australia’s “strategic backyard”, or gains access to ports, communications systems or other strategic facilities, Australia’s defence advantage based on geographic distance could further decline.
Therefore, Australia’s recent efforts to increase aid, deepen policing cooperation and promote defence agreements are essentially responses to the new security pressures created by China’s expanding influence. However, the question remains whether this strategic awakening has come too late.
Who Is China Really Sending a Message To?
Observers generally believe that the missile test was not solely a response to Australia’s recent security agreements with Pacific island countries. Its primary target was more likely the United States.
By launching a long-range ballistic missile from a strategic nuclear submarine, China demonstrated that its nuclear capabilities are no longer limited to land-based missiles, but are increasingly developing into a diversified nuclear deterrence system that includes sea-based capabilities. This indicates stronger long-range projection capabilities and reflects continued progress in China’s military modernisation.
Although China has long maintained a “no first use” nuclear policy, it has continued expanding its nuclear arsenal and developing advanced military technologies in recent years. According to the US Department of Defense’s China Military Power Report, China’s nuclear arsenal has grown rapidly in recent years and is moving towards a goal of possessing more than 1,000 nuclear warheads by 2030.
If China further develops long-range bombers, strategic aviation forces and related weapons systems, it could gradually complete a “nuclear triad” structure — consisting of land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles and air-launched nuclear platforms — creating nuclear deterrence capabilities across land, sea and air domains. This would not only represent an increase in China’s military capability but could also alter the long-standing strategic balance in the Indo-Pacific, which has been dominated by the United States.
However, what concerns Australia and other countries is not the missile test itself, but the gap between China’s rapidly expanding military capabilities and its limited strategic transparency. While Beijing continues to modernise its military, expand its nuclear arsenal and enhance long-range strike capabilities, it has not increased transparency at the same pace, making it difficult for other countries to accurately assess its long-term strategic intentions.
Therefore, while the test may not have directly targeted Australia, it remains an important warning. China demonstrated not just a single weapons capability, but an expanding strategic projection system. As these capabilities extend closer to Australia’s surrounding waters and the Pacific region, Australia’s challenge is no longer simply traditional security concerns created by geography, but how to respond to a China with increasingly expanding military influence.
How Should Australia Respond?
China’s continued military growth does not mean Australia is already in an irreversible disadvantageous position, but it does show that the era of relying on geographic distance for security is gradually ending. Australia’s future challenge is not only how to respond to one missile test, but how to build a more resilient national security system in a rapidly changing Indo-Pacific strategic environment.
The Lowy Institute has pointed out that China continues to expand its naval forces and plans to have around 25 nuclear-powered attack submarines by 2035, compared with an estimated nine currently. In comparison, although Australia is developing nuclear-powered submarines through the AUKUS security partnership, its future fleet size will remain relatively limited. Furthermore, China’s submarine construction speed currently exceeds that of the United States, meaning the maritime balance of power in the Indo-Pacific is gradually changing.
However, researchers also emphasise that this does not mean China is preparing to attack Australia. The key concern is not whether China currently intends to do so, but that it is gradually developing the capability to do so. Australia’s defence planning cannot focus only on whether another country currently has hostile intentions, but must consider whether that country would have the ability to act militarily if circumstances change. Therefore, Australia can no longer assume “distance equals security” and must establish a more comprehensive defence strategy.
Australia’s future approach should not only involve increasing defence spending or purchasing advanced weapons. It must also improve maritime surveillance and early warning capabilities, protect undersea cables and critical infrastructure, deepen security cooperation with allies, and continue strengthening long-term partnerships with Pacific island countries. Only through these measures can Australia maintain strategic initiative in an increasingly complex Indo-Pacific environment.
Winning the Pacific Requires More Than Security Cooperation
In recent years, many Australian Pacific policies have focused on balancing China’s influence. However, if Australia views Pacific island countries merely as pieces in geopolitical competition, it risks overlooking the issues these nations actually care about. For many island countries, climate change, infrastructure shortages, healthcare limitations, youth unemployment and economic development are far more urgent than great power competition.
Taking Solomon Islands as an example, the country currently faces challenges including youth unemployment, pressure on public healthcare and rising financial burdens. Compared with geopolitical rivalry between major powers, local communities are more concerned about whether living standards can improve and whether their countries can achieve sustainable development. Australia’s previous malaria prevention programmes in Solomon Islands, which significantly reduced infection rates, provide an example of successful cooperation. Such initiatives gained local support because Australia responded to practical development needs rather than using aid purely as a strategic tool.
This demonstrates that if Australia wants to maintain long-term influence in the South Pacific, security cooperation and financial assistance alone are insufficient. More importantly, Australia must build trust. Only by responding to island nations’ development, climate and social needs through equality, respect and mutual benefit can Australia become a partner they genuinely rely on. After all, Pacific island countries are not limited to choosing between China and Australia, but will continue seeking cooperation that best serves their own interests.
China has not “won” the South Pacific, and Australia has not completely lost its influence. This will be a long-term competition for regional influence. Facing China’s growing military capabilities and expanding diplomatic and security presence in the South Pacific, Australia must redefine not only its defence strategy but also how it builds a long-term approach that protects its own security while earning the trust of regional partners in an Indo-Pacific environment where competition and cooperation coexist.