Victorian Premier Jacinta Allan embarked on her first visit to China since taking office, from September 14 to 19, lasting five days. Her itinerary included Beijing, Shanghai, as well as Victoria’s sister cities Nanjing, Chengdu, and Deyang. Accompanied by Labor MPs, she met with Chinese officials and business leaders. The focus was on boosting trade, promoting education exchanges, expanding the tourism market, and attracting more Chinese students and investment, with the aim of raising Victoria’s profile in China.
Is Victoria’s Relationship with China Over?
China has long been Victoria’s largest trading partner and the main source of international visitors. Allan’s office framed this trip as “the beginning of a new golden era” and emphasized that the purpose was to rebuild friendship with China.
Looking back, former premier Daniel Andrews had strongly promoted cooperation with China and even signed the “Belt and Road” agreement in 2018. However, the federal government later exercised its power under the Foreign Arrangements Scheme Act for the first time, canceling two agreements Victoria signed with China, citing inconsistency with Australia’s foreign policy or harm to foreign relations. This move provoked strong dissatisfaction from Beijing, with China’s Foreign Ministry harshly criticizing Australia for having “no sincerity in improving China–Australia relations.”
Subsequently, relations between China and Australia deteriorated further due to multiple controversies. Australia criticized Beijing’s actions regarding Hong Kong protests and human rights issues in Xinjiang, and supported the World Health Organization’s independent investigation into the COVID-19 outbreak. Meanwhile, Australian intelligence agencies exposed China’s attempts to influence local politics through political donations, sparking national security concerns. These events further strained bilateral ties.
Even so, Victoria tried to maintain exchanges with China, establishing sister-city relationships with several Chinese cities and consolidating ties through education and business cooperation, attempting to preserve collaboration within an otherwise tense climate.
But compared with Andrews’ “pro-China” image, Allan faces a more delicate situation. After stepping down two years ago, Andrews turned to private business, becoming a consultant with close links to Chinese enterprises. More recently, he even appeared at a military parade in Tiananmen Square and was photographed with President Xi Jinping and other Chinese leaders, sparking controversy. As the current premier, Allan has said, “”Victoria is an old friend of China and these connections are so valuable for our state,” but she must strike a far more cautious balance between cooperation with China and domestic political sentiment.
Judging by the arrangements of this visit, China’s reception of Allan was clearly not on par with that of Andrews in the past. She only met with Minister of Education Huai Jinpeng, and her first policy speech was held merely at a hotel. This treatment was far less prestigious than Andrews’ high-level invitation to witness the Tiananmen parade just a week earlier. Observers speculate that Beijing attaches limited importance to the current Victorian government, possibly because the “Belt and Road” agreements were overturned by the federal government, or due to the broader backdrop of strained China–Australia relations.
The Contradictions of Education Diplomacy
One major highlight of this trip was to deepen education cooperation. In its newly released Victoria’s China Strategy: For a New Golden Era, the Victorian government pointed out that in 2024 the international education industry contributed as much as AUD 15.9 billion to the state’s economy, remaining Victoria’s largest service export for more than two decades. Among this, Chinese students numbered 64,000, making China the largest source country. The document listed “continue to strengthen our reputation as a preferred destination for Chinese visitors, students, researchers, and investors” as a strategic priority, emphasizing the need to further consolidate Victoria’s image as a global destination for Chinese tourists, students, researchers, and investors.
When meeting Chinese Education Minister Huai Jinpeng in Beijing, Allan repeatedly stressed Victoria’s welcoming attitude toward Chinese students, hoping to expand bilateral exchanges through stronger educational cooperation and demonstrating the importance she attaches to “education diplomacy.”
However, this proactive approach sharply contrasts with federal policy. In August 2025, the Australian federal government announced a new student quota system, capping the total number of international students nationwide at 295,000 in 2026. Although this figure was 25,000 higher than the current year, industry insiders believe that due to persistent restrictions in the immigration system, actual numbers are unlikely to reach the cap. This runs counter to Victoria’s slogan of “saying yes to international students,” revealing a clear policy gap between the state and federal levels.
Under this contradictory framework, Victoria’s efforts to deepen cooperation with China through education remain constrained by federal policy, making it difficult for the state to achieve significant breakthroughs on its own. With the failed Belt and Road experience still fresh, it is understandable why Beijing did not devote much attention to the current premier. Against this backdrop, Allan could only meet with China’s education minister, raising doubts about how much real progress could be made.
Underwhelming Economic and Trade Outcomes
Just as politics offered little warmth, business results also proved lackluster. Many expected one of Allan’s key goals would be to seek Chinese funding for the Suburban Rail Loop (SRL) project, which faces a massive AUD 34 billion funding shortfall. This expectation was heightened by the fact that the rail line runs through electorates represented by several members of the delegation.
Yet, only a handful of business meetings were reported, with few major corporations participating. The visible results amounted to just two announcements: a solar energy cooperation project at the beginning of the trip, and at the end, the purchase of four tunnel boring machines (TBMs) from Chinese manufacturers for the SRL project.
The former was limited in scale and faced local criticism—during construction the project would create only about 60 temporary jobs, and after completion just six permanent positions, with minimal local employment benefits and potential environmental impacts.
The latter, although Allan made a point of visiting tunnel works in Deyang, Sichuan, and staged photo opportunities to emphasize Victoria’s cooperation with China, was essentially “spending money on imports.” While buying Chinese TBMs secured equipment for the SRL, it raised questions: why not develop or support such technology domestically, creating local jobs and industries, instead of sending huge sums abroad?
In other words, these arrangements mostly involved one-way capital outflow, without bringing in real foreign investment or capital inflows. The outcomes fell short of expectations for “attracting Chinese investment,” leaving only purchases and symbolic cooperation. With political recognition lacking and economic results unimpressive, what substantive benefits did this trip actually deliver for Victoria’s economy?
Economic Diplomacy or Electioneering?
For Allan, the trip was something of a dilemma. As premier, she could not avoid going to China during her term. But at the same time, she surely knew it would be hard to achieve real breakthroughs. The result was like a salesman being ignored despite enthusiasm, or a poor relative knocking on doors only to be turned away. Why, then, did Allan still lead a high-profile delegation to China?
Funded by taxpayers at an estimated cost of several hundred thousand dollars, the delegation did not include a single minister—only MPs from electorates with large Chinese or multicultural populations. They included Parliamentary Secretary and Box Hill MP Paul Hamer, and four Labor backbenchers: Meng Heang Tak (Clarinda), Mathew Hilakari (Point Cook), Matt Fregon (Ashwood), and John Mullahy (Glen Waverley).
According to the 2021 census, Victoria has around 500,000 residents of Chinese descent, a significant share of the state’s 7 million population. In these key electorates, Chinese voters number in the tens of thousands, enough to influence electoral outcomes. While these accompanying MPs may have little policy influence, they are politically important. This raises questions over whether Allan’s visit was more about connecting with the Chinese community ahead of the November 2026 state election, consolidating a large and crucial voter bloc. Rather than an economic diplomacy mission, it may have been a campaign-style political tour.
The trip delivered limited results, with symbolism outweighing substance. Allan brought back no new investment and no major corporate commitments, while her accompanying MPs became the focus. What can these powerless backbenchers actually bring to Victoria? Do they signal attention to multicultural communities and bolster diplomatic credentials? Or was this merely a “taxpayer-funded election show,” with taxpayer money spent on photo ops in China to build momentum for the next election? Anyone with a bit of political sense can see through it.
Multicultural Development
Just before the trip, the Victorian government released the Victoria’s Multicultural Review, regarded as the most significant policy reform in decades. Led by George Lekakis AO and an expert advisory group, it drew on 57 community meetings, consultations with over 640 residents, and input from more than 150 organizations and community groups. The goal was to strengthen social cohesion and rebuild trust between the government and multicultural communities. The report was released on September 11 by Allan and Minister for Multicultural Affairs Ingrid Stitt.
Core recommendations include establishing a new statutory agency, Multicultural Victoria, headed by a Multicultural Coordinator General, supported by two deputies (one from a rural area), and advised by a five-member commissioner panel. This structure would replace the largely ceremonial Victorian Multicultural Commission (VMC), which for years was limited to public relations without significant policy impact.
Following the review’s release, Allan quickly linked “multiculturalism” with the Chinese community. On September 12, in her hometown Bendigo, she announced nearly AUD 400,000 in funding to upgrade the Golden Dragon Museum into the “National Chinese Museum of Australia.” This symbolic move not only highlighted Bendigo’s historical ties to Chinese immigrants during the gold rush but also aimed to strengthen the cultural status of the Chinese community in Victoria.
Other funded projects included the Mingyue Buddhist Temple in Springvale South, the Avalokiteshvara Yuan Tong Monastery underground car park in Deer Park, the Museum of Chinese Australian History in Melbourne CBD, and infrastructure and lighting upgrades at the Chinese Association of Victoria Inc in Wantirna. These investments enhance cultural facilities and directly address community needs.
Is Multiculturalism a Political Tool or Genuine Goal?
This raises the question: are Allan’s initiatives genuinely aimed at fostering social cohesion, or are they part of political calculation? Victoria has long led the country in multicultural policy, but its political functions are also significant. During Andrews’ era, “multiculturalism” was used to package economic cooperation with China, drawing criticism of “national security risks” and “overdependence.” Allan now continues this approach but faces cool responses from Beijing and skepticism from the opposition and media at home.
Still, Allan’s strategy is not identical to Andrews’. Unlike the 2016 version of the “China Strategy,” her policy no longer emphasizes export figures or the economic benefits of the Belt and Road, but instead focuses more on cultural exchange and community engagement, encouraging Chinese-Australians to actively shape interactions with China. This shift highlights interpersonal and cultural connections rather than purely commercial transactions.
She has repeatedly wrapped her policies in “personal stories”: from Beijing to Nanjing to Shanghai, she promoted not just Victoria’s universities, tourism, and agricultural products, but also the importance of shared history, language, and culture. When meeting Education Minister Huai Jinpeng, she mentioned that her 13-year-old daughter is learning Chinese, to foster relatability.
Thus, Allan’s “multicultural strategy” carries two possible meanings: on one hand, it shows a sincere wish to improve social cohesion and strengthen ties with the Chinese community; on the other hand, it inevitably serves political calculation and election mobilization. As the 2026 state election approaches, Allan’s ability to convince both the Chinese community and the broader electorate that this is more than just political maneuvering but a genuine social vision will be a critical test of her leadership.
Still Unresolved: Practical Needs of Multicultural Communities
Even if Allan today offers small grants or gestures of goodwill toward the Chinese community, they pale in comparison to Andrews’ campaign promises in 2014 and 2018, when he pledged nearly AUD 20 million for the Chinese and Indian communities to purchase land for building aged care facilities. These two groups are now Victoria’s largest multicultural communities, and both place high cultural importance on caring for elders. Whether the elderly receive proper care in later life is a vital issue.
In 2018, the Australian government noted that as people live longer, the number of dementia patients is surging. For non-English-speaking elderly migrants—many of whom either never learned English or lose it due to dementia—the need for care in their native language and cultural context is especially acute. Yet mainstream services remain unwilling to provide such care. Therefore, the government has a responsibility to help minority communities build appropriate aged care facilities. Andrews recognized this situation and made it a campaign pledge.
But to this day, the Victorian government has only “purchased” the land and has not handed it over to community groups to build facilities—an 11-year failure that could be seen as the biggest “betrayal” of minority communities in Victorian history. By appealing to immigrant communities that value elder care, Andrews gained their votes to govern Victoria, but apparently never intended to deliver on his promises. It was a shameless act. Yet after Allan took over, she did not address the issue. Worse, last year she changed project rules, stripping Chinese and Indian community organizations of eligibility to apply to build aged care homes.
Clearly, the Allan government’s actions today sharply contradict its rhetoric about promoting multicultural development. This is likely to become a key concern for multicultural community voters in next year’s state election.