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What Is the Significance of Victorian Premier Jacinta Allan’s First Visit to China?

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Victorian Premier Jacinta Allan embarked on her first visit to China since taking office, from September 14 to 19, lasting five days. Her itinerary included Beijing, Shanghai, as well as Victoria’s sister cities Nanjing, Chengdu, and Deyang. Accompanied by Labor MPs, she met with Chinese officials and business leaders. The focus was on boosting trade, promoting education exchanges, expanding the tourism market, and attracting more Chinese students and investment, with the aim of raising Victoria’s profile in China.

 

Is Victoria’s Relationship with China Over?

 

China has long been Victoria’s largest trading partner and the main source of international visitors. Allan’s office framed this trip as “the beginning of a new golden era” and emphasized that the purpose was to rebuild friendship with China.

 

Looking back, former premier Daniel Andrews had strongly promoted cooperation with China and even signed the “Belt and Road” agreement in 2018. However, the federal government later exercised its power under the Foreign Arrangements Scheme Act for the first time, canceling two agreements Victoria signed with China, citing inconsistency with Australia’s foreign policy or harm to foreign relations. This move provoked strong dissatisfaction from Beijing, with China’s Foreign Ministry harshly criticizing Australia for having “no sincerity in improving China–Australia relations.”

 

Subsequently, relations between China and Australia deteriorated further due to multiple controversies. Australia criticized Beijing’s actions regarding Hong Kong protests and human rights issues in Xinjiang, and supported the World Health Organization’s independent investigation into the COVID-19 outbreak. Meanwhile, Australian intelligence agencies exposed China’s attempts to influence local politics through political donations, sparking national security concerns. These events further strained bilateral ties.

 

Even so, Victoria tried to maintain exchanges with China, establishing sister-city relationships with several Chinese cities and consolidating ties through education and business cooperation, attempting to preserve collaboration within an otherwise tense climate.

 

But compared with Andrews’ “pro-China” image, Allan faces a more delicate situation. After stepping down two years ago, Andrews turned to private business, becoming a consultant with close links to Chinese enterprises. More recently, he even appeared at a military parade in Tiananmen Square and was photographed with President Xi Jinping and other Chinese leaders, sparking controversy. As the current premier, Allan has said, “”Victoria is an old friend of China and these connections are so valuable for our state,” but she must strike a far more cautious balance between cooperation with China and domestic political sentiment.

 

Judging by the arrangements of this visit, China’s reception of Allan was clearly not on par with that of Andrews in the past. She only met with Minister of Education Huai Jinpeng, and her first policy speech was held merely at a hotel. This treatment was far less prestigious than Andrews’ high-level invitation to witness the Tiananmen parade just a week earlier. Observers speculate that Beijing attaches limited importance to the current Victorian government, possibly because the “Belt and Road” agreements were overturned by the federal government, or due to the broader backdrop of strained China–Australia relations.

 

The Contradictions of Education Diplomacy

 

One major highlight of this trip was to deepen education cooperation. In its newly released Victoria’s China Strategy: For a New Golden Era, the Victorian government pointed out that in 2024 the international education industry contributed as much as AUD 15.9 billion to the state’s economy, remaining Victoria’s largest service export for more than two decades. Among this, Chinese students numbered 64,000, making China the largest source country. The document listed “continue to strengthen our reputation as a preferred destination for Chinese visitors, students, researchers, and investors” as a strategic priority, emphasizing the need to further consolidate Victoria’s image as a global destination for Chinese tourists, students, researchers, and investors.

 

When meeting Chinese Education Minister Huai Jinpeng in Beijing, Allan repeatedly stressed Victoria’s welcoming attitude toward Chinese students, hoping to expand bilateral exchanges through stronger educational cooperation and demonstrating the importance she attaches to “education diplomacy.”

 

However, this proactive approach sharply contrasts with federal policy. In August 2025, the Australian federal government announced a new student quota system, capping the total number of international students nationwide at 295,000 in 2026. Although this figure was 25,000 higher than the current year, industry insiders believe that due to persistent restrictions in the immigration system, actual numbers are unlikely to reach the cap. This runs counter to Victoria’s slogan of “saying yes to international students,” revealing a clear policy gap between the state and federal levels.

 

Under this contradictory framework, Victoria’s efforts to deepen cooperation with China through education remain constrained by federal policy, making it difficult for the state to achieve significant breakthroughs on its own. With the failed Belt and Road experience still fresh, it is understandable why Beijing did not devote much attention to the current premier. Against this backdrop, Allan could only meet with China’s education minister, raising doubts about how much real progress could be made.

 

Underwhelming Economic and Trade Outcomes

 

Just as politics offered little warmth, business results also proved lackluster. Many expected one of Allan’s key goals would be to seek Chinese funding for the Suburban Rail Loop (SRL) project, which faces a massive AUD 34 billion funding shortfall. This expectation was heightened by the fact that the rail line runs through electorates represented by several members of the delegation.

 

Yet, only a handful of business meetings were reported, with few major corporations participating. The visible results amounted to just two announcements: a solar energy cooperation project at the beginning of the trip, and at the end, the purchase of four tunnel boring machines (TBMs) from Chinese manufacturers for the SRL project.

 

The former was limited in scale and faced local criticism—during construction the project would create only about 60 temporary jobs, and after completion just six permanent positions, with minimal local employment benefits and potential environmental impacts.

 

The latter, although Allan made a point of visiting tunnel works in Deyang, Sichuan, and staged photo opportunities to emphasize Victoria’s cooperation with China, was essentially “spending money on imports.” While buying Chinese TBMs secured equipment for the SRL, it raised questions: why not develop or support such technology domestically, creating local jobs and industries, instead of sending huge sums abroad?

 

In other words, these arrangements mostly involved one-way capital outflow, without bringing in real foreign investment or capital inflows. The outcomes fell short of expectations for “attracting Chinese investment,” leaving only purchases and symbolic cooperation. With political recognition lacking and economic results unimpressive, what substantive benefits did this trip actually deliver for Victoria’s economy?

 

Economic Diplomacy or Electioneering?

 

For Allan, the trip was something of a dilemma. As premier, she could not avoid going to China during her term. But at the same time, she surely knew it would be hard to achieve real breakthroughs. The result was like a salesman being ignored despite enthusiasm, or a poor relative knocking on doors only to be turned away. Why, then, did Allan still lead a high-profile delegation to China?

 

Funded by taxpayers at an estimated cost of several hundred thousand dollars, the delegation did not include a single minister—only MPs from electorates with large Chinese or multicultural populations. They included Parliamentary Secretary and Box Hill MP Paul Hamer, and four Labor backbenchers: Meng Heang Tak (Clarinda), Mathew Hilakari (Point Cook), Matt Fregon (Ashwood), and John Mullahy (Glen Waverley).

 

According to the 2021 census, Victoria has around 500,000 residents of Chinese descent, a significant share of the state’s 7 million population. In these key electorates, Chinese voters number in the tens of thousands, enough to influence electoral outcomes. While these accompanying MPs may have little policy influence, they are politically important. This raises questions over whether Allan’s visit was more about connecting with the Chinese community ahead of the November 2026 state election, consolidating a large and crucial voter bloc. Rather than an economic diplomacy mission, it may have been a campaign-style political tour.

 

The trip delivered limited results, with symbolism outweighing substance. Allan brought back no new investment and no major corporate commitments, while her accompanying MPs became the focus. What can these powerless backbenchers actually bring to Victoria? Do they signal attention to multicultural communities and bolster diplomatic credentials? Or was this merely a “taxpayer-funded election show,” with taxpayer money spent on photo ops in China to build momentum for the next election? Anyone with a bit of political sense can see through it.

 

Multicultural Development

 

Just before the trip, the Victorian government released the Victoria’s Multicultural Review, regarded as the most significant policy reform in decades. Led by George Lekakis AO and an expert advisory group, it drew on 57 community meetings, consultations with over 640 residents, and input from more than 150 organizations and community groups. The goal was to strengthen social cohesion and rebuild trust between the government and multicultural communities. The report was released on September 11 by Allan and Minister for Multicultural Affairs Ingrid Stitt.

 

Core recommendations include establishing a new statutory agency, Multicultural Victoria, headed by a Multicultural Coordinator General, supported by two deputies (one from a rural area), and advised by a five-member commissioner panel. This structure would replace the largely ceremonial Victorian Multicultural Commission (VMC), which for years was limited to public relations without significant policy impact.

 

Following the review’s release, Allan quickly linked “multiculturalism” with the Chinese community. On September 12, in her hometown Bendigo, she announced nearly AUD 400,000 in funding to upgrade the Golden Dragon Museum into the “National Chinese Museum of Australia.” This symbolic move not only highlighted Bendigo’s historical ties to Chinese immigrants during the gold rush but also aimed to strengthen the cultural status of the Chinese community in Victoria.

 

Other funded projects included the Mingyue Buddhist Temple in Springvale South, the Avalokiteshvara Yuan Tong Monastery underground car park in Deer Park, the Museum of Chinese Australian History in Melbourne CBD, and infrastructure and lighting upgrades at the Chinese Association of Victoria Inc in Wantirna. These investments enhance cultural facilities and directly address community needs.

 

Is Multiculturalism a Political Tool or Genuine Goal?

 

This raises the question: are Allan’s initiatives genuinely aimed at fostering social cohesion, or are they part of political calculation? Victoria has long led the country in multicultural policy, but its political functions are also significant. During Andrews’ era, “multiculturalism” was used to package economic cooperation with China, drawing criticism of “national security risks” and “overdependence.” Allan now continues this approach but faces cool responses from Beijing and skepticism from the opposition and media at home.

 

Still, Allan’s strategy is not identical to Andrews’. Unlike the 2016 version of the “China Strategy,” her policy no longer emphasizes export figures or the economic benefits of the Belt and Road, but instead focuses more on cultural exchange and community engagement, encouraging Chinese-Australians to actively shape interactions with China. This shift highlights interpersonal and cultural connections rather than purely commercial transactions.

 

She has repeatedly wrapped her policies in “personal stories”: from Beijing to Nanjing to Shanghai, she promoted not just Victoria’s universities, tourism, and agricultural products, but also the importance of shared history, language, and culture. When meeting Education Minister Huai Jinpeng, she mentioned that her 13-year-old daughter is learning Chinese, to foster relatability.

 

Thus, Allan’s “multicultural strategy” carries two possible meanings: on one hand, it shows a sincere wish to improve social cohesion and strengthen ties with the Chinese community; on the other hand, it inevitably serves political calculation and election mobilization. As the 2026 state election approaches, Allan’s ability to convince both the Chinese community and the broader electorate that this is more than just political maneuvering but a genuine social vision will be a critical test of her leadership.

 

Still Unresolved: Practical Needs of Multicultural Communities

 

Even if Allan today offers small grants or gestures of goodwill toward the Chinese community, they pale in comparison to Andrews’ campaign promises in 2014 and 2018, when he pledged nearly AUD 20 million for the Chinese and Indian communities to purchase land for building aged care facilities. These two groups are now Victoria’s largest multicultural communities, and both place high cultural importance on caring for elders. Whether the elderly receive proper care in later life is a vital issue.

 

In 2018, the Australian government noted that as people live longer, the number of dementia patients is surging. For non-English-speaking elderly migrants—many of whom either never learned English or lose it due to dementia—the need for care in their native language and cultural context is especially acute. Yet mainstream services remain unwilling to provide such care. Therefore, the government has a responsibility to help minority communities build appropriate aged care facilities. Andrews recognized this situation and made it a campaign pledge.

 

But to this day, the Victorian government has only “purchased” the land and has not handed it over to community groups to build facilities—an 11-year failure that could be seen as the biggest “betrayal” of minority communities in Victorian history. By appealing to immigrant communities that value elder care, Andrews gained their votes to govern Victoria, but apparently never intended to deliver on his promises. It was a shameless act. Yet after Allan took over, she did not address the issue. Worse, last year she changed project rules, stripping Chinese and Indian community organizations of eligibility to apply to build aged care homes.

 

Clearly, the Allan government’s actions today sharply contradict its rhetoric about promoting multicultural development. This is likely to become a key concern for multicultural community voters in next year’s state election.

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A Short Break Before Continuing the Journey

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This year, the world has continued to pass through turmoil.
Israel has temporarily stopped its attacks on Gaza. I hope that this region, after nearly 80 years of conflict, can finally move toward peace. I remember when I was young, I believed that this land was given by God to the Israelites, and therefore they had the right to kill all others in order to protect the land that belonged to them. I can only admit my ignorance. Yet this did not cause me to lose my faith; rather, it taught me to seek and understand the One I believe in amid questioning and doubt.

December is the time when we remember the birth of Jesus Christ—a season when people would bless one another. Sameway sends blessings to every reader, whether you are in Australia or gone overseas. May you experience peace that comes from God, and not only enjoy a relaxing holiday with your family, but also share quality time together. Our colleagues will also take a short break, and we will resume publication in early January next year, journeying with our readers once again.

While our office will be relocating, the daily news commentary we launched on our website this year will continue throughout this period though. Our transformation of Sameway into a multi-platform Chinese media outlet will also continue next year. It is your support that convinces us that Sameway is not just a publication—it is a calling for a group of Christians to walk with the Chinese community. It is also the blessing God wants to bring to the community through us. We hope that in the coming year, Sameway will continue to stand firm as a Chinese publication committed to speaking truth.

Today, anyone making a request to U.S. President Trump must first praise his greatness and contributions—no different from the Cultural Revolution-style rhetoric we despise. Western politicians call this “political reality.” Russia, as an aggressor, shamelessly claims to “grant” conditions for peace to Ukraine, and other Western leaders must endure and compromise. Australians continue to face economic and living pressures, and immigrants are still scapegoated as the root of these problems, leaving people anxious. Sadly, last week Hong Kong suffered a once-in-a-century fire disaster, causing 151 deaths and the destruction of countless properties—a heartbreaking tragedy. Even more tragic is witnessing the indifference of Hong Kong officials responsible for the incident, and the fact that Hong Kong has now been fully absorbed into the Chinese model of governance—an authoritarian system dominated entirely by “national security” or the will of its leaders, where no one may question the truth of events or demand government accountability.

Yet, in the midst of such helplessness, I still believe that the God who rules over history is the same God who loves humanity—who gave His only Son Jesus to the world to redeem humankind.

Wishing all our readers a Merry Christmas and a Happy New Year! See you next year.

Mr. Raymond Chow, Publisher

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A Glimmer of Hope Amid Disaster

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A massive fire has revealed to the world the hardships Hong Kong society is currently facing. Seven 31-storey buildings—with roughly 1,700 units—were destroyed in a 43-hour blaze, leaving nearly two thousand families homeless. The 156 people who died, including many elderly residents and the domestic workers who cared for them, left their families devastated: most victims simply had no chance to escape because the flames spread rapidly and the fire alarm never sounded. The shocking footage—resembling iconic scenes from a disaster film—circulated online within a single day, prompting many to ask: Is this the suffering now endured by the place once known as the “Pearl of the Orient”?

World leaders offered their condolences to Hongkongers. Chinese President Xi Jinping expressed sorrow for the victims and extended sympathy to their families and survivors. Pope Leo XIV and King Charles III conveyed their condolences; Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese expressed care and support for Hong Kong people. Hong Kong tycoon Li Ka-shing immediately donated HKD $80 million for disaster relief and distributed emergency aid, earning widespread approval. Citizens brought clothes, food, and supplies to the disaster site to help affected residents, showing a spirit of mutual aid in times of hardship.

During the fire, many waited anxiously near the site, hoping their loved ones would emerge safely. For those who reunited with family, there was relief—an ember of hope amid catastrophe. But others were forced to accept, in an instant, that their loved ones had been burned to death, reduced to ashes, having suffered unbearable agony in their final moments. Their grief, anger, and pain naturally lead to a single question: Who will be held accountable for this?

Yet the response from senior Hong Kong officials has been deeply disappointing.

A Government That “Cannot Be Wrong”

The Hong Kong government’s first reaction was astonishing: it blamed the fire on the use of bamboo scaffolding and immediately pushed for legislation to ban bamboo scaffolds. Without proper investigation, the government casually pinned the problem on bamboo, leaving the public with the impression that officials were merely searching for a “not us” excuse—an attitude cold and indifferent to human life.

Yet the footage showed the opposite. The falling bamboo poles were not on fire; instead, flames raced along the sheets of netting wrapped around the buildings. The blame placed on bamboo looked like a crude attempt to deflect responsibility.

When it was later suggested that non-compliant, flammable netting was the real reason the fire spread so quickly, the relevant bureau chief hastily declared that the materials had “been verified as compliant,” prompting widespread disbelief. Those who questioned the government were then accused of “inciting hatred” or being “troublemakers”—a clear reflection of the post-2019 logic in Hong Kong: the government is always right, and anyone who questions it is subversive.

While the entire city was gripped by shock and grief, authorities chose repression over empathy, acting as if heavy-handed tactics could simply bury public anger. This showed a profound misunderstanding of Hong Kong’s unique social fabric and international context. With the world watching, expecting Hongkongers to react like citizens long conditioned under an authoritarian regime in the mainland revealed a startling lack of political awareness.

As a result, Hongkongers across the globe—supported by international media—laid bare the deeper societal, structural, and governance failures behind the fire.

A Government Accountable to the People

Democratic governments may be inefficient or inconsistent, but those that ignore their people for too long ultimately get voted out. Thus they at least claim accountability. In disasters, the most essential response is empathy and acknowledgment of public concerns—not suppression or demands for silence.

The Hong Kong fire has drawn global attention, causing many to suddenly re-examine the skyscrapers built worldwide over recent decades. No matter the country, these massive structures can become sources of catastrophe. I still remember watching Paul Newman’s 1974 classic The Towering Inferno, a film built around fears of high-rise disasters: a 138-storey skyscraper becomes an inferno during its opening ceremony because of cost-cutting and substandard safety systems. The film’s message was clear—human arrogance and greed can turn innovation into tragedy.

Hong Kong’s dense population means high-rise living is long normalized; Australian cities like Melbourne and Sydney have similarly embraced this lifestyle. But have we truly learned how to live safely in such environments? The fire at Hong Fuk Court—and similar tragedies like London’s 2017 Grenfell Tower fire—are harsh lessons for modern societies on managing high-density urban living.

The Hong Kong fire demonstrates clearly that the city—including its government—has not yet learned to manage such buildings safely. When officials treat victims’ questions as threats to national security, it shows an unwillingness to confront reality.

China’s rapid urbanization means cities across the mainland now resemble Hong Kong, sharing similar latent risks. Ensuring these skyscrapers are safe homes is also a pressing concern for the central government. I do not believe Beijing will ignore the lessons of this Hong Kong disaster or use “national security” as an excuse to bury the underlying problems; that would not benefit China either.

Recent developments suggest the central government may pursue accountability among Hong Kong officials. Perhaps, amid all the suffering, this is one small glimmer of hope for Hongkongers.

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Tai Po Inferno Was a Man-Made Disaster

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On 26 November 2025, a massive fire broke out at Wang Fuk Court in Tai Po, Hong Kong, during exterior wall renovation. Flames raced along the scaffolding and netting, igniting seven residential blocks at once. The blaze spread from one building to the entire estate in minutes. As of 2 December, the disaster had left 156 people dead and more than 30 missing, making it one of the deadliest residential fires in decades worldwide.

Caught between grief and fury, the public cannot help but ask:
Was this an accident, or a tragedy created by systemic failure?

A Disaster Rooted in Sheer Complacency

First-hand footage circulating online shows how quickly the fire spread. The primary cause was the use of non–fire-retardant scaffolding netting and foam panels. Under the Buildings Department and Labour Department’s guidelines, netting must be flame-retardant and self-extinguish within three seconds of ignition. But the netting seen on-site shot up in flames immediately.

Investigations revealed an even more infuriating detail:
Some contractors did purchase compliant fire-retardant netting — but installed it only at the base of each building, replacing the rest with ordinary, non-compliant netting to save roughly HKD 20,000 (about 105,800 TWD). Additionally, foam boards were used to seal some unit windows, funneling flames directly into homes. These materials had long been prohibited, yet were still used simply because they were cheap.

What’s worse, this danger was no secret.
For years, watchdog groups warned the government about flammable netting. Since 2023, Civic Sight chairman Michael Poon had sent over 80 emails to authorities about unsafe scaffolding in various housing estates. In May 2025, he specifically named Wang Fuk Court as using suspiciously non-compliant netting — but letters to the Fire Services Department never received a formal reply.

Residents also lodged complaints to multiple departments, only to be told that officials had “checked the certificates” or that fire risks were “low,” with no further action taken.

Engineers note that government inspections focus mainly on whether the structure of the scaffolding is secure, not whether the materials are fire resistant — effectively outsourcing public safety to the industry’s “self-discipline.” With lax oversight, contractors adopted a “no one checks anyway” mindset that turned regulations into empty words.

Inside the fire zone, fire safety systems also failed. Automatic alarms, sprinklers, hydrants, and fire bells in the eight buildings were all found to be nonfunctional, depriving residents of early escape warnings. Some exits were clogged with debris. It took three and a half hours from the first report for the incident to be upgraded to a five-alarm fire — a delay that worsened casualties.

From flammable materials, to inadequate government oversight, to malfunctioning fire systems, every layer of failure stacked together.
Let’s be clear: This was a man-made disaster.

Who Bears Responsibility?

If this was a man-made tragedy, where exactly did the system fail?

Police have arrested 15 people on suspicion of manslaughter, including executives from the main contractor, consulting engineers, and subcontractors involved in scaffolding and façade work.

The incident has also sparked another controversy:
Were there political–business entanglements?

DAB Tai Po South district councilor Wong Pik-kiu served as an adviser to the Wang Fuk Court owners’ corporation from early 2024 to 2025. During her tenure, the corporation approved the renovation project. She allegedly lobbied owners door-to-door to support the works and pushed for multiple controversial decisions, including simultaneous works on multiple blocks — increasing both risk and cost.

A district councilor serving as an OC adviser is a highly sensitive overlap. Councillors are expected to act as neutral third parties safeguarding public interest, whereas OC advisers handle tenders, project monitoring, and major financial decisions. The dual role naturally raises questions of conflict of interest.

Whether the OC, councilor, and contractors engaged in collusion, dereliction of duty, or even corruption remains under investigation by the ICAC and police.
But the tragedy exposes deep structural issues in Hong Kong’s building management system, which is a clear warning sign for the OC mechanism.

The Wider Problem: Aging Buildings and Weak Oversight

Old-building maintenance is a territory-wide problem. Wang Fuk Court is not an isolated case.
In 2021, Hong Kong had 27,000 buildings over 30 years old. By 2046, the number will rise to 40,000. With aging buildings, major repairs, fire system upgrades, escape-route improvements, and structural checks are becoming increasingly urgent.

But most homeowners lack engineering knowledge and rely entirely on their owners’ corporations. OC committee members are volunteers with limited time and expertise. Under pressure from mandatory inspection deadlines, they often make poor decisions with incomplete information.

Meanwhile, OCs hold enormous power — they manage all repair funds and approve all works — yet face minimal oversight. Bid-rigging and collusion are widespread.
Classic tactics involve competitors privately agreeing who should “win” a tender, distorting competition and harming owners.

Although Wang Fuk Court’s repair fund was managed by the OC, the Housing Bureau — overseer of subsidized housing — also cannot escape blame. With massive project costs and questionable workmanship, why did authorities not intervene or conduct deeper audits?
These systemic gaps enable problems to repeat endlessly.

How Australia Handles Major Repairs and Tendering

In contrast to Hong Kong’s volunteer-run OC model, Australia’s strata property system uses professional management + statutory regulation.

Owners corporations hire licensed strata managers, who then appoint independent building consultants to assess required works. Tendering follows a transparent, standardized process that includes checking contractor licences, insurance, and track records.

Owners rarely deal directly with contractors, reducing information asymmetry and the risk of lobbying. Major expenses must be approved by the owners’ meeting, and strata managers must provide written reports and bear legal accountability.

This creates clear divisions of responsibility, heightens transparency, and minimizes corruption, bid-rigging, and low-quality work. Contractors have fewer opportunities to privately lobby homeowners or manipulate the tendering process.

Is the Government Truly Responding to Public Demands?

After the disaster was widely recognized as man-made, public anger exploded.
Residents, experts, scholars, and former officials all condemned the failure of Hong Kong’s regulatory system and demanded accountability.

Residents quickly formed the Tai Po Wang Fuk Court Fire Concern Group, raising four demands on 28 November:

  1. Ensure proper rehousing for affected residents

  2. Establish an independent commission of inquiry

  3. Conduct a comprehensive review of major-repairs regulations

  4. Hold departments accountable for oversight failures

Over 5,000 online signatures were collected the next day.

Under intense public pressure, Chief Executive John Lee announced on 3 December the formation of an “independent committee” led by a judge to examine the fire and its rapid spread.

However — and this is crucial — this body is not a statutory Commission of Inquiry.
A COI, established under the Commissions of Inquiry Ordinance, has legal powers to summon witnesses, demand documents, and take sworn testimony, giving it far stronger investigative and accountability capabilities.

By comparison, the “independent committee” lacks compulsory powers and focuses on “review and prevention” rather than defining responsibility or recommending disciplinary action.

This falls far short of public expectations, raising doubts about whether the government genuinely intends to confront the issue.

A Second Fire: The Fire of Distrust

In the aftermath of the Wang Fuk Court inferno, the community displayed remarkable self-organisation: residents gathered supplies, assisted displaced families, compiled lists of elderly neighbours, and coordinated temporary support. These actions were the natural response of civil society stepping in when public governance collapses. And while contractor negligence and construction issues sparked public outrage, an even deeper anger targeted the government’s total failure in oversight and crisis management.

Ironically, as residents were busy helping one another, some volunteers were arrested on suspicion of “incitement.” The fire broke out just days before the 7 December Legislative Council election. In the eyes of the government, any form of spontaneous community mobilisation seemed to be viewed as a “risk” rather than support.

Haunted by the shadow of 2019, the authorities remain terrified of bottom-up community organising. Instead of crisis management, they engage in risk suppression—focusing on dampening social sentiment rather than improving rescue efficiency. Blame is shifted toward “those who raise questions,” instead of the systems that produced the problem in the first place.

These reactions transformed what could have been a moment of community unity into a much deeper crisis of public trust.

Beijing’s Disaster Narrative

In sharp contrast to the Hong Kong government’s understated approach, Beijing intervened swiftly and publicly. President Xi Jinping ordered full rescue efforts and expressed condolences immediately. Yet such speed also suggests that Beijing vividly remembers the 2022 Urumqi fire, which triggered the “White Paper Movement.”

In Chinese political logic, fires are never just accidents—they can become flashpoints of public anger. With long-standing grievances over housing policy, old-building safety, and the culture of unaccountability, Beijing moved quickly to prevent emotions from spilling over.

Notably, the Office for Safeguarding National Security in Hong Kong issued a statement during the rescue phase, warning that “anti-China, destabilising forces are waiting to create chaos,” emphasising that political stability overrides everything else.

Under China’s crisis-management style, officials frequently shift public focus from “the causes and responsibility of the disaster” toward “the hardship and heroism of rescue workers.” Following the Wang Fuk Court fire, some local media began flooding the airwaves with stories of brave firefighters and tireless medical staff, all being positive narratives that subtly eclipse the underlying issues of flammable materials, broken systems, and weak oversight.

By swiftly arresting a few contractors and engineers, authorities aim to frame the incident as the fault of several “technical offenders,” preventing accountability from extending to systemic failures or government departments.

This narrative reframes a man-made tragedy into a supposed showcase of “government mobilisation,” diluting public scrutiny and preventing grief and anger from evolving into collective resistance.

A particularly important detail:
In the early stages, several Western media outlets focused heavily on the idea that “bamboo scaffolding is inherently risky,” while barely discussing the scaffolding netting, material quality, or regulatory negligence. This inadvertently echoed the Hong Kong government’s early narrative frame. It also exposed a cultural bias—an assumption that bamboo equals danger—overlooking the rigorous safety standards of Hong Kong’s traditional scaffolding industry. As a result, some international reporting unintentionally helped divert attention away from structural, institutional failures during the crucial first days.

Who Should Be Held Accountable?

The shock of this catastrophe lies not only in the scale of casualties but in the fact that behind what seems like an “accident” are layers of systemic failure—from flammable netting and dead fire-safety systems, to weak regulation, chaotic building management, bid-rigging culture, and the government’s post-disaster reliance on a national-security framework to manage public sentiment.

So, the fundamental question remains:
Who is responsible for this fire?

As of the copy deadline (3 December) and after the seven-day mourning period, Hong Kong has seen zero officials, zero government departments, and zero senior leaders take any responsibility. Whether this was an accident or a man-made disaster is beyond obvious, yet the government—obsessed with saving face—refuses to admit regulatory failure. Instead, it blames bamboo and a handful of contractors, shrinking a deeply interconnected man-made catastrophe into the fault of a few convenient scapegoats.

AFP put it bluntly when a reporter asked Chief Executive John Lee:

“You said you want to lead Hong Kong from stability to prosperity.
But in this ‘prosperous’ society you described, 151 people have died in a single fire.
Why do you still deserve to keep your job?”

From 2019, to the pandemic, to the collapse of the medical system, and now this fire—no one has ever been held accountable for catastrophic policy failures.

What Can We Do?

The disaster is far from over. The real challenges are only beginning: nearly 2,000 households across the eight blocks face long-term displacement, trauma, and the struggle to rebuild their lives.

For Hongkongers and Chinese people living in Australia, what can be done?

Perhaps the answer is simpler—and more important—than we think:
Support those affected. Emotionally, psychologically, and materially. Even from afar, offering solidarity, sharing information, donating to practical assistance, or simply staying engaged with the issue matters.

After a tragedy like this, our role is not only to mourn.
It is to refuse to let the disaster fade away without accountability or reform.
And it is to remind ourselves, gently but urgently:
cherish the people beside us, and hold close those who still walk this uncertain world with us.

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