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Multicultural Aged Care Landbank Policy: Victoria Labor Government Cheated Chinese Voters
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1 month agoon
In Victoria, the proportion of overseas-born residents increased from 20.4% in 2006 to 29.9% in 2021, while the proportion of households speaking a language other than English rose from 20.4% to 27%. Consequently, since 2010, both major political parties have actively introduced immigrant-friendly policies to win support from migrant communities. In 2008, Ted Baillieu of the Liberal Party launched a Chinese-language opposition leader column in this publication, successfully gaining significant Chinese votes and becoming Premier in 2010. In 2014, Labor’s Daniel Andrews proposed buying land and leasing it to Chinese and Indian communities for aged care facilities, winning back votes in Victoria’s two largest multicultural communities from the Liberals. Labor has remained in power since then. In 2018, Andrews repeated the strategy, allocating AUD 7.25 million to purchase more land near Mount Dandenong and inviting Chinese community organizations to build additional aged care facilities. However, while the land was purchased, four parcels promised for minority-led aged care projects remain unused and have not been handed over to minority communities.
Since 2014, Labor has pledged to build hundreds of aged care facilities tailored to the language and culture of minority seniors. Yet, over the past 11 years, not a single additional bed has been provided for Victoria’s Chinese or South Asian elders. Meanwhile, the lands originally intended for these facilities have remained vacant, leaving hundreds of non-English-speaking seniors to spend their final years in environments where communication is limited and care is inadequate. The internal problems within the Labor government have gone largely ignored by mainstream media and society.
Multicultural Aged Care Landbank
In recent years, the Victorian government has introduced several policies addressing aged care for multicultural communities, including the “Multicultural Aged Care Landbank” program. On the surface, this policy aims to provide culturally and linguistically appropriate facilities, particularly for Chinese, Indian, and other migrant seniors. However, examining the policy’s development and implementation reveals significant challenges and inequities faced by the Chinese community. Greater vigilance is required in participation, oversight, and safeguarding community interests. This article aims to help Chinese seniors, families, and community organizations in Melbourne better understand the policy and prepare for future aged care needs.
Policy Origins: Promises, Pilots, and Initial Steps (2014–2015)
Ahead of the 2014 Victorian state election, Labor launched a platform including 100,000 new jobs and large-scale infrastructure projects. While education, health, and transport were mentioned, the Multicultural Aged Care Landbank policy did not appear in official campaign documents, suggesting it was a niche election promise rather than a key platform. This low-profile launch left room for future policy adjustments, as there was limited public oversight or a clear definition.
In July 2015, Labor announced an agreement with nonprofit Southern Cross Care to build a 90-bed aged care facility at North Williamstown. Officially part of the Landbank program, this project aimed to address rising inner-city land costs that made it difficult for nonprofit providers to acquire land near the city. Although labeled “multicultural,” it was primarily a general land reserve/support program for nonprofits, not specifically focused on multicultural seniors. This early inconsistency between promise and action foreshadowed the marginalization of the Chinese community.
Policy Evolution: From Landbank to Altered Conditions (2016–2024)
In October 2017, the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) issued a call for expressions of interest (EOI) for aged care facilities in Springvale South targeting the Chinese community. The EOI allowed existing or newly established nonprofit Chinese organizations to apply without being approved as aged care providers, focusing on cultural competence and fundraising capacity. The Chinese Community Council of Australia (Vic Chapter, CCCAV) was selected in October 2018 and paired with experienced provider Doutta Galla, intending to build in Springvale South. While initially seen as a win, CCCAV reportedly failed to raise funds and did not secure the land.
In the 2019–20 state budget, the government purchased a 10,000 m² site at 227 Manningham Road, Templestowe Lower, for over AUD 10 million. A second EOI in 2021 invited Chinese nonprofit organizations to lease the land. However, delays occurred. After CCCAV submitted a complete application in early 2022, Ernst & Young reviewed it, and no decision was made before the 2022 election. In July 2023, after multiple negotiations, the DHHS decided to restart the application process. Delays reportedly increased construction costs by more than AUD 600,000.
By November 2024, a new EOI for four parcels (two for Chinese, two for Indian communities) required applicants to be approved residential aged care providers, excluding many Chinese community organizations like CCCAV, which lacked such status. Currently, Victoria has only three Chinese-language aged care facilities. This shift effectively returned community-led opportunities to mainstream providers, and the EOI was not widely communicated to prior participants, giving them less than four weeks to apply—a clearly unfair process.
From Promise to Marginalization: Community-Led to Provider-Led
Initially, the policy allowed community organizations, particularly Chinese groups, to participate and potentially become aged care providers. By 2024, requiring approved provider status would exclude these organizations, undermining years of preparation. For the Chinese community, this meant that promised land and construction opportunities were reduced, and community-led participation was weakened.
Additionally, the “multicultural” label masked the reality that government resources and processes favored large mainstream providers. According to the Ethnic Communities’ Council of Victoria (ECCV) 2018 report, over 30% of seniors in Victoria aged 65+ come from non-English-speaking backgrounds, often facing disadvantages in care services.
Shifting from community-led to provider-led reduces culturally and linguistically appropriate care opportunities, forcing Chinese seniors to accept services with less cultural sensitivity. Procedural opacity and tight timelines disproportionately exclude resource-limited organizations, widening the trust gap between the community and government.
Chinese Communities Can No Longer Remain Bystanders
Over the years, the government has conveyed promises to immigrant communities through the Landbank program: appropriate facilities, cultural and language services, and community-led development. Yet, the experience of the Chinese community reveals the risk of “overpromising”: communities invited to participate were ultimately excluded by large providers, land commitments remained unfulfilled, and processes were opaque and frequently changed. As a result, policies that should have been implemented remain largely theoretical.
For Melbourne’s Chinese community, this is not just policy analysis but a practical issue affecting elder care and community welfare. Families and organizations must actively participate, plan, monitor processes, and advocate for culturally sensitive care to ensure seniors receive truly appropriate services.
A deeper issue is that Labor’s superficially sincere policy clearly misled minority communities and won their votes in the 2014, 2018, and 2022 elections. In the 2022 election, our publication asked Premier Andrews why he had broken trust with the Chinese community. He arrogantly responded, “The land was purchased; it’s your Chinese community that refused it, not the government’s failure.”
I replied, “The land in question, located in Springvale South and now a 10,000 m² site in Templestowe Lower, was allocated to the Chinese Community Council of Australia (Vic Chapter), founded by retired Labor MP Lin Meifeng in 2018. With AUD 7.25 million funding from the 2019 federal Liberal government, any Chinese community organization could have built on it.”
However, over the past three years, facing fiscal strain and huge debt, the Victorian Labor government has not prioritized assisting Chinese community organizations. The Victorian Liberals, weakened internally, are unable to supervise the government. With the rise of independent MPs at the federal level since 2022, the next state election may see independent minority candidates raise this agenda, forcing major parties to confront it.
It is now time for multicultural communities to speak up and compel the Victorian government to address its long-term neglect of minority elders.
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This year, the world has continued to pass through turmoil.
Israel has temporarily stopped its attacks on Gaza. I hope that this region, after nearly 80 years of conflict, can finally move toward peace. I remember when I was young, I believed that this land was given by God to the Israelites, and therefore they had the right to kill all others in order to protect the land that belonged to them. I can only admit my ignorance. Yet this did not cause me to lose my faith; rather, it taught me to seek and understand the One I believe in amid questioning and doubt.
December is the time when we remember the birth of Jesus Christ—a season when people would bless one another. Sameway sends blessings to every reader, whether you are in Australia or gone overseas. May you experience peace that comes from God, and not only enjoy a relaxing holiday with your family, but also share quality time together. Our colleagues will also take a short break, and we will resume publication in early January next year, journeying with our readers once again.
While our office will be relocating, the daily news commentary we launched on our website this year will continue throughout this period though. Our transformation of Sameway into a multi-platform Chinese media outlet will also continue next year. It is your support that convinces us that Sameway is not just a publication—it is a calling for a group of Christians to walk with the Chinese community. It is also the blessing God wants to bring to the community through us. We hope that in the coming year, Sameway will continue to stand firm as a Chinese publication committed to speaking truth.
Today, anyone making a request to U.S. President Trump must first praise his greatness and contributions—no different from the Cultural Revolution-style rhetoric we despise. Western politicians call this “political reality.” Russia, as an aggressor, shamelessly claims to “grant” conditions for peace to Ukraine, and other Western leaders must endure and compromise. Australians continue to face economic and living pressures, and immigrants are still scapegoated as the root of these problems, leaving people anxious. Sadly, last week Hong Kong suffered a once-in-a-century fire disaster, causing 151 deaths and the destruction of countless properties—a heartbreaking tragedy. Even more tragic is witnessing the indifference of Hong Kong officials responsible for the incident, and the fact that Hong Kong has now been fully absorbed into the Chinese model of governance—an authoritarian system dominated entirely by “national security” or the will of its leaders, where no one may question the truth of events or demand government accountability.
Yet, in the midst of such helplessness, I still believe that the God who rules over history is the same God who loves humanity—who gave His only Son Jesus to the world to redeem humankind.
Wishing all our readers a Merry Christmas and a Happy New Year! See you next year.
Mr. Raymond Chow, Publisher

A massive fire has revealed to the world the hardships Hong Kong society is currently facing. Seven 31-storey buildings—with roughly 1,700 units—were destroyed in a 43-hour blaze, leaving nearly two thousand families homeless. The 156 people who died, including many elderly residents and the domestic workers who cared for them, left their families devastated: most victims simply had no chance to escape because the flames spread rapidly and the fire alarm never sounded. The shocking footage—resembling iconic scenes from a disaster film—circulated online within a single day, prompting many to ask: Is this the suffering now endured by the place once known as the “Pearl of the Orient”?
World leaders offered their condolences to Hongkongers. Chinese President Xi Jinping expressed sorrow for the victims and extended sympathy to their families and survivors. Pope Leo XIV and King Charles III conveyed their condolences; Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese expressed care and support for Hong Kong people. Hong Kong tycoon Li Ka-shing immediately donated HKD $80 million for disaster relief and distributed emergency aid, earning widespread approval. Citizens brought clothes, food, and supplies to the disaster site to help affected residents, showing a spirit of mutual aid in times of hardship.
During the fire, many waited anxiously near the site, hoping their loved ones would emerge safely. For those who reunited with family, there was relief—an ember of hope amid catastrophe. But others were forced to accept, in an instant, that their loved ones had been burned to death, reduced to ashes, having suffered unbearable agony in their final moments. Their grief, anger, and pain naturally lead to a single question: Who will be held accountable for this?
Yet the response from senior Hong Kong officials has been deeply disappointing.
A Government That “Cannot Be Wrong”
The Hong Kong government’s first reaction was astonishing: it blamed the fire on the use of bamboo scaffolding and immediately pushed for legislation to ban bamboo scaffolds. Without proper investigation, the government casually pinned the problem on bamboo, leaving the public with the impression that officials were merely searching for a “not us” excuse—an attitude cold and indifferent to human life.
Yet the footage showed the opposite. The falling bamboo poles were not on fire; instead, flames raced along the sheets of netting wrapped around the buildings. The blame placed on bamboo looked like a crude attempt to deflect responsibility.
When it was later suggested that non-compliant, flammable netting was the real reason the fire spread so quickly, the relevant bureau chief hastily declared that the materials had “been verified as compliant,” prompting widespread disbelief. Those who questioned the government were then accused of “inciting hatred” or being “troublemakers”—a clear reflection of the post-2019 logic in Hong Kong: the government is always right, and anyone who questions it is subversive.
While the entire city was gripped by shock and grief, authorities chose repression over empathy, acting as if heavy-handed tactics could simply bury public anger. This showed a profound misunderstanding of Hong Kong’s unique social fabric and international context. With the world watching, expecting Hongkongers to react like citizens long conditioned under an authoritarian regime in the mainland revealed a startling lack of political awareness.
As a result, Hongkongers across the globe—supported by international media—laid bare the deeper societal, structural, and governance failures behind the fire.
A Government Accountable to the People
Democratic governments may be inefficient or inconsistent, but those that ignore their people for too long ultimately get voted out. Thus they at least claim accountability. In disasters, the most essential response is empathy and acknowledgment of public concerns—not suppression or demands for silence.
The Hong Kong fire has drawn global attention, causing many to suddenly re-examine the skyscrapers built worldwide over recent decades. No matter the country, these massive structures can become sources of catastrophe. I still remember watching Paul Newman’s 1974 classic The Towering Inferno, a film built around fears of high-rise disasters: a 138-storey skyscraper becomes an inferno during its opening ceremony because of cost-cutting and substandard safety systems. The film’s message was clear—human arrogance and greed can turn innovation into tragedy.
Hong Kong’s dense population means high-rise living is long normalized; Australian cities like Melbourne and Sydney have similarly embraced this lifestyle. But have we truly learned how to live safely in such environments? The fire at Hong Fuk Court—and similar tragedies like London’s 2017 Grenfell Tower fire—are harsh lessons for modern societies on managing high-density urban living.
The Hong Kong fire demonstrates clearly that the city—including its government—has not yet learned to manage such buildings safely. When officials treat victims’ questions as threats to national security, it shows an unwillingness to confront reality.
China’s rapid urbanization means cities across the mainland now resemble Hong Kong, sharing similar latent risks. Ensuring these skyscrapers are safe homes is also a pressing concern for the central government. I do not believe Beijing will ignore the lessons of this Hong Kong disaster or use “national security” as an excuse to bury the underlying problems; that would not benefit China either.
Recent developments suggest the central government may pursue accountability among Hong Kong officials. Perhaps, amid all the suffering, this is one small glimmer of hope for Hongkongers.

On 26 November 2025, a massive fire broke out at Wang Fuk Court in Tai Po, Hong Kong, during exterior wall renovation. Flames raced along the scaffolding and netting, igniting seven residential blocks at once. The blaze spread from one building to the entire estate in minutes. As of 2 December, the disaster had left 156 people dead and more than 30 missing, making it one of the deadliest residential fires in decades worldwide.
Caught between grief and fury, the public cannot help but ask:
Was this an accident, or a tragedy created by systemic failure?
A Disaster Rooted in Sheer Complacency
First-hand footage circulating online shows how quickly the fire spread. The primary cause was the use of non–fire-retardant scaffolding netting and foam panels. Under the Buildings Department and Labour Department’s guidelines, netting must be flame-retardant and self-extinguish within three seconds of ignition. But the netting seen on-site shot up in flames immediately.
Investigations revealed an even more infuriating detail:
Some contractors did purchase compliant fire-retardant netting — but installed it only at the base of each building, replacing the rest with ordinary, non-compliant netting to save roughly HKD 20,000 (about 105,800 TWD). Additionally, foam boards were used to seal some unit windows, funneling flames directly into homes. These materials had long been prohibited, yet were still used simply because they were cheap.
What’s worse, this danger was no secret.
For years, watchdog groups warned the government about flammable netting. Since 2023, Civic Sight chairman Michael Poon had sent over 80 emails to authorities about unsafe scaffolding in various housing estates. In May 2025, he specifically named Wang Fuk Court as using suspiciously non-compliant netting — but letters to the Fire Services Department never received a formal reply.
Residents also lodged complaints to multiple departments, only to be told that officials had “checked the certificates” or that fire risks were “low,” with no further action taken.
Engineers note that government inspections focus mainly on whether the structure of the scaffolding is secure, not whether the materials are fire resistant — effectively outsourcing public safety to the industry’s “self-discipline.” With lax oversight, contractors adopted a “no one checks anyway” mindset that turned regulations into empty words.
Inside the fire zone, fire safety systems also failed. Automatic alarms, sprinklers, hydrants, and fire bells in the eight buildings were all found to be nonfunctional, depriving residents of early escape warnings. Some exits were clogged with debris. It took three and a half hours from the first report for the incident to be upgraded to a five-alarm fire — a delay that worsened casualties.
From flammable materials, to inadequate government oversight, to malfunctioning fire systems, every layer of failure stacked together.
Let’s be clear: This was a man-made disaster.
Who Bears Responsibility?
If this was a man-made tragedy, where exactly did the system fail?
Police have arrested 15 people on suspicion of manslaughter, including executives from the main contractor, consulting engineers, and subcontractors involved in scaffolding and façade work.
The incident has also sparked another controversy:
Were there political–business entanglements?
DAB Tai Po South district councilor Wong Pik-kiu served as an adviser to the Wang Fuk Court owners’ corporation from early 2024 to 2025. During her tenure, the corporation approved the renovation project. She allegedly lobbied owners door-to-door to support the works and pushed for multiple controversial decisions, including simultaneous works on multiple blocks — increasing both risk and cost.
A district councilor serving as an OC adviser is a highly sensitive overlap. Councillors are expected to act as neutral third parties safeguarding public interest, whereas OC advisers handle tenders, project monitoring, and major financial decisions. The dual role naturally raises questions of conflict of interest.
Whether the OC, councilor, and contractors engaged in collusion, dereliction of duty, or even corruption remains under investigation by the ICAC and police.
But the tragedy exposes deep structural issues in Hong Kong’s building management system, which is a clear warning sign for the OC mechanism.
The Wider Problem: Aging Buildings and Weak Oversight
Old-building maintenance is a territory-wide problem. Wang Fuk Court is not an isolated case.
In 2021, Hong Kong had 27,000 buildings over 30 years old. By 2046, the number will rise to 40,000. With aging buildings, major repairs, fire system upgrades, escape-route improvements, and structural checks are becoming increasingly urgent.
But most homeowners lack engineering knowledge and rely entirely on their owners’ corporations. OC committee members are volunteers with limited time and expertise. Under pressure from mandatory inspection deadlines, they often make poor decisions with incomplete information.
Meanwhile, OCs hold enormous power — they manage all repair funds and approve all works — yet face minimal oversight. Bid-rigging and collusion are widespread.
Classic tactics involve competitors privately agreeing who should “win” a tender, distorting competition and harming owners.
Although Wang Fuk Court’s repair fund was managed by the OC, the Housing Bureau — overseer of subsidized housing — also cannot escape blame. With massive project costs and questionable workmanship, why did authorities not intervene or conduct deeper audits?
These systemic gaps enable problems to repeat endlessly.
How Australia Handles Major Repairs and Tendering
In contrast to Hong Kong’s volunteer-run OC model, Australia’s strata property system uses professional management + statutory regulation.
Owners corporations hire licensed strata managers, who then appoint independent building consultants to assess required works. Tendering follows a transparent, standardized process that includes checking contractor licences, insurance, and track records.
Owners rarely deal directly with contractors, reducing information asymmetry and the risk of lobbying. Major expenses must be approved by the owners’ meeting, and strata managers must provide written reports and bear legal accountability.
This creates clear divisions of responsibility, heightens transparency, and minimizes corruption, bid-rigging, and low-quality work. Contractors have fewer opportunities to privately lobby homeowners or manipulate the tendering process.
Is the Government Truly Responding to Public Demands?
After the disaster was widely recognized as man-made, public anger exploded.
Residents, experts, scholars, and former officials all condemned the failure of Hong Kong’s regulatory system and demanded accountability.
Residents quickly formed the Tai Po Wang Fuk Court Fire Concern Group, raising four demands on 28 November:
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Ensure proper rehousing for affected residents
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Establish an independent commission of inquiry
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Conduct a comprehensive review of major-repairs regulations
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Hold departments accountable for oversight failures
Over 5,000 online signatures were collected the next day.
Under intense public pressure, Chief Executive John Lee announced on 3 December the formation of an “independent committee” led by a judge to examine the fire and its rapid spread.
However — and this is crucial — this body is not a statutory Commission of Inquiry.
A COI, established under the Commissions of Inquiry Ordinance, has legal powers to summon witnesses, demand documents, and take sworn testimony, giving it far stronger investigative and accountability capabilities.
By comparison, the “independent committee” lacks compulsory powers and focuses on “review and prevention” rather than defining responsibility or recommending disciplinary action.
This falls far short of public expectations, raising doubts about whether the government genuinely intends to confront the issue.

A Second Fire: The Fire of Distrust
In the aftermath of the Wang Fuk Court inferno, the community displayed remarkable self-organisation: residents gathered supplies, assisted displaced families, compiled lists of elderly neighbours, and coordinated temporary support. These actions were the natural response of civil society stepping in when public governance collapses. And while contractor negligence and construction issues sparked public outrage, an even deeper anger targeted the government’s total failure in oversight and crisis management.
Ironically, as residents were busy helping one another, some volunteers were arrested on suspicion of “incitement.” The fire broke out just days before the 7 December Legislative Council election. In the eyes of the government, any form of spontaneous community mobilisation seemed to be viewed as a “risk” rather than support.
Haunted by the shadow of 2019, the authorities remain terrified of bottom-up community organising. Instead of crisis management, they engage in risk suppression—focusing on dampening social sentiment rather than improving rescue efficiency. Blame is shifted toward “those who raise questions,” instead of the systems that produced the problem in the first place.
These reactions transformed what could have been a moment of community unity into a much deeper crisis of public trust.
Beijing’s Disaster Narrative
In sharp contrast to the Hong Kong government’s understated approach, Beijing intervened swiftly and publicly. President Xi Jinping ordered full rescue efforts and expressed condolences immediately. Yet such speed also suggests that Beijing vividly remembers the 2022 Urumqi fire, which triggered the “White Paper Movement.”
In Chinese political logic, fires are never just accidents—they can become flashpoints of public anger. With long-standing grievances over housing policy, old-building safety, and the culture of unaccountability, Beijing moved quickly to prevent emotions from spilling over.
Notably, the Office for Safeguarding National Security in Hong Kong issued a statement during the rescue phase, warning that “anti-China, destabilising forces are waiting to create chaos,” emphasising that political stability overrides everything else.
Under China’s crisis-management style, officials frequently shift public focus from “the causes and responsibility of the disaster” toward “the hardship and heroism of rescue workers.” Following the Wang Fuk Court fire, some local media began flooding the airwaves with stories of brave firefighters and tireless medical staff, all being positive narratives that subtly eclipse the underlying issues of flammable materials, broken systems, and weak oversight.
By swiftly arresting a few contractors and engineers, authorities aim to frame the incident as the fault of several “technical offenders,” preventing accountability from extending to systemic failures or government departments.
This narrative reframes a man-made tragedy into a supposed showcase of “government mobilisation,” diluting public scrutiny and preventing grief and anger from evolving into collective resistance.
A particularly important detail:
In the early stages, several Western media outlets focused heavily on the idea that “bamboo scaffolding is inherently risky,” while barely discussing the scaffolding netting, material quality, or regulatory negligence. This inadvertently echoed the Hong Kong government’s early narrative frame. It also exposed a cultural bias—an assumption that bamboo equals danger—overlooking the rigorous safety standards of Hong Kong’s traditional scaffolding industry. As a result, some international reporting unintentionally helped divert attention away from structural, institutional failures during the crucial first days.
Who Should Be Held Accountable?
The shock of this catastrophe lies not only in the scale of casualties but in the fact that behind what seems like an “accident” are layers of systemic failure—from flammable netting and dead fire-safety systems, to weak regulation, chaotic building management, bid-rigging culture, and the government’s post-disaster reliance on a national-security framework to manage public sentiment.
So, the fundamental question remains:
Who is responsible for this fire?
As of the copy deadline (3 December) and after the seven-day mourning period, Hong Kong has seen zero officials, zero government departments, and zero senior leaders take any responsibility. Whether this was an accident or a man-made disaster is beyond obvious, yet the government—obsessed with saving face—refuses to admit regulatory failure. Instead, it blames bamboo and a handful of contractors, shrinking a deeply interconnected man-made catastrophe into the fault of a few convenient scapegoats.
AFP put it bluntly when a reporter asked Chief Executive John Lee:
“You said you want to lead Hong Kong from stability to prosperity.
But in this ‘prosperous’ society you described, 151 people have died in a single fire.
Why do you still deserve to keep your job?”
From 2019, to the pandemic, to the collapse of the medical system, and now this fire—no one has ever been held accountable for catastrophic policy failures.
What Can We Do?
The disaster is far from over. The real challenges are only beginning: nearly 2,000 households across the eight blocks face long-term displacement, trauma, and the struggle to rebuild their lives.
For Hongkongers and Chinese people living in Australia, what can be done?
Perhaps the answer is simpler—and more important—than we think:
Support those affected. Emotionally, psychologically, and materially. Even from afar, offering solidarity, sharing information, donating to practical assistance, or simply staying engaged with the issue matters.
After a tragedy like this, our role is not only to mourn.
It is to refuse to let the disaster fade away without accountability or reform.
And it is to remind ourselves, gently but urgently:
cherish the people beside us, and hold close those who still walk this uncertain world with us.
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