As global attention shifts toward the conflict between Israel and Iran, the Russia-Ukraine war appears to be gradually moving away from the centre of international headlines. Europe, Russia and China have all appeared relatively subdued on the surface, with none of the dramatic diplomatic clashes or military mobilisation seen in the early stages of the war. But silence does not mean stagnation. On the contrary, away from the spotlight, a deeper strategic restructuring is quietly unfolding.
Among the most significant developments is the European Union’s “ReArm Europe” initiative proposed last year.
Reshaping the order
In March last year, the United States announced a suspension of part of its military aid to Ukraine, sending shockwaves through Europe’s security architecture. Around the same time, the European Union formally launched its “Readiness 2030” defence plan, proposing up to €800 billion in military and defence investment.
The plan focuses on joint weapons procurement, expanding defence industrial capacity, strengthening air defence systems, drone and artillery production, while continuing support for Ukraine.
This is not simply an increase in defence spending, but a signal of a broader historical shift.
For decades, Europe was built on one central assumption: security would be guaranteed by the US-led transatlantic system, allowing Europe to focus on economic growth, welfare and market integration. However, as Washington’s strategic focus shifted toward the Indo-Pacific and President Donald Trump returned to the White House with a different stance on NATO and aid to Ukraine, Europe has begun to realise that the security framework underpinning the post-war order may no longer be stable.
The question is no longer whether Europe needs defence, but whether the system that once provided Europe with security still truly exists. The implications of this shift also extend far beyond Europe itself.
For Australia, which has long relied on US security guarantees and remains deeply tied to the Anglo-American strategic system, Europe’s rearmament raises a similarly sensitive and practical question: as the world moves back toward militarisation and American security commitments become increasingly conditional, can Australia still assume the old order will remain intact?
The end of the peace dividend
Since the end of the Cold War, Europe has existed in what was often described as the era of the “peace dividend”.
Following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of East-West confrontation, many European countries reduced defence spending, downsized their militaries and allowed defence industries to decline. Security was treated as an established condition, while economic growth, free markets and regional integration became the core priorities of European politics.
For nearly three decades, this arrangement was considered almost self-evident, with many believing that large-scale war had disappeared from the European continent. That assumption is now rapidly reversing.
From Germany’s announcement of a €100 billion special defence fund, to large-scale military expansion across Northern and Eastern Europe, and the EU’s push for joint defence investment and industrial cooperation, European military spending is rising at a pace unseen since the Cold War.
Countries are reopening arms production lines, increasing ammunition stockpiles and discussing joint defence and rapid deployment mechanisms. Europe’s strategic thinking is undergoing a fundamental transformation.
European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen reflected this atmosphere during a joint press conference in 2023, stating that Europe must adopt “a bolder security policy” and build defence capabilities capable of sustaining long-term wars and crises.
This is not merely a numerical increase in spending, but a shift in policy logic itself.
When America becomes uncertain
If the Russia-Ukraine war was the trigger for Europe’s rearmament, the deeper driving force may actually be uncertainty surrounding the United States.
For decades, Europe’s security structure rested on a core assumption: regardless of global developments, the United States would ultimately intervene and guarantee Europe’s security. From NATO to US troop deployments across Europe, the transatlantic order was treated as a permanent reality and enabled Europe to reduce military spending while prioritising economic development.
That assumption is now beginning to weaken.
From Trump-era demands for NATO allies to dramatically raise defence spending, to fluctuating US support for Ukraine and increasingly ambiguous American security commitments, Washington’s role has become less predictable.
For Europe, this uncertainty may be even more destabilising than Russia itself. What worries Europe is not only external threats, but whether the United States is still willing to bear the cost of intervention when crises emerge.
If the Cold War question was “will the enemy attack?”, today’s question has become “will the ally still show up?”
As security can no longer be fully outsourced, Europe has little choice but to rebuild its own defence capabilities.
The concept of “strategic autonomy”, once championed mainly by France and viewed by some European states as overly idealistic, is increasingly shifting from political slogan to practical policy.
Europe has realised that while it may still need the United States, it can no longer fully depend on it. But autonomy comes at a cost.
The ability to disagree
Germany and Spain have emerged as two of the most active participants in Europe’s rearmament efforts.
Germany’s defence spending is expected to rise from €95 billion in 2025 to €162 billion by 2029, while Berlin is also reviving military conscription with plans to expand troop numbers to around 460,000 personnel. For a country that suppressed its military role for decades after World War II, the shift is highly symbolic.
At the same time, these countries have begun displaying greater diplomatic independence than in previous years.
On issues ranging from the Gaza war and tariffs on China, to Iran and NATO military deployments, Germany has not always fully aligned itself with the United States.
In early 2026, Germany also led efforts to establish the “E6” alliance alongside France, Poland, Spain, Italy and the Netherlands. The grouping is seen as an attempt to form a new European core bloc focused on rare earth resources, defence industries, energy and strategic supply chains, while reducing internal EU decision-making constraints.
To some observers, the move represents an extension of the idea of a “multi-speed Europe”, in which major powers integrate first to create a more agile strategic centre.
Spain has also increasingly diverged from Washington’s positions.
During the recent US and Israeli military actions against Iran, Spain openly opposed the operations and refused to allow certain American military bases on Spanish territory to be used for support activities. Reports later emerged that Washington was considering trade pressure against Spain, highlighting how tensions between Europe and the United States are now moving beyond diplomatic disagreements into deeper strategic conflicts.
Taken together, these developments suggest Europe is increasingly preparing for a world in which American leadership may no longer be guaranteed.
This does not mean Europe seeks a break with the United States. NATO remains the core framework of European security, and the US is still Europe’s most important military power. However, Europe has begun recognising that the old order — in which the US led and Europe followed — is gradually weakening.
A new geopolitical centre of gravity may already be forming.
Australia’s place in a changing world
For Australia, these changes are particularly significant.
Australia’s security outlook has long been shaped by geography. As a continent surrounded by oceans, Australia has faced few direct land-based threats, while neighbouring countries have historically lacked the military capacity to mount a full-scale challenge.
This is why Australian defence thinking traditionally focused on “forward defence” and reliance on allies.
That environment is now changing.
As China’s influence in Pacific island nations expands — through ports, security agreements and infrastructure projects — Beijing is increasingly entering what Australia once regarded as its strategic backyard.
This does not necessarily mean China intends to launch military action against Australia, but it does suggest Australia’s surrounding strategic environment is being reshaped.
The real issue may not be whether China would attack Australia, but whether Australia can still assume control over its surrounding region as it once did.
From a purely military perspective, directly invading Australia would be extremely costly. Australia’s vast territory, dispersed population and lack of concentrated strategic targets reduce its attractiveness as a military objective.
For China, economic influence through trade, investment and diplomacy is likely far more effective than war in achieving access to resources or strategic leverage.
But this also reflects a broader reality: future great power competition may not necessarily take the form of conventional war.
Instead, competition may increasingly involve supply chains, technological penetration, ports, infrastructure, energy dependence, cyber systems and information influence.
In other words, the definition of security itself is changing.
Rethinking Australia’s position
If Europe’s rearmament exposes fractures in the post-war order, Australia faces a deeper question: how should it reposition itself amid this global restructuring?
For decades, Australia’s security policy has rested on two pillars — military reliance on the United States and historical and intelligence ties with Britain.
From ANZUS to AUKUS, these relationships have continued to deepen. Australian strategic thinking has largely been built around the Anglo-American security framework.
But if American commitments to Europe are no longer guaranteed, can Australia still assume it will always remain a priority?
This is not an argument against the importance of the US-Australia alliance, but a recognition of its potential vulnerabilities.
In an increasingly multipolar and fragmented world, overreliance on a single security provider may itself become a strategic weakness.
Should US domestic politics shift further inward, middle-power allies such as Australia may face growing pressure to develop greater strategic autonomy.
This raises another question that Australia has rarely confronted seriously: beyond the United States, are there alternative forms of security cooperation?
Europe as a partner?
Historically, Australia’s defence cooperation with Europe has remained relatively limited, partly because Europe itself long depended on American protection.
But this may now be changing.
As Europe expands its defence industries and pursues more independent strategic frameworks, countries such as France and Germany may increasingly emerge not only as economic partners, but also as important security actors.
France in particular already maintains overseas territories and military presence throughout the Pacific, from New Caledonia to French Polynesia.
Europe has always existed within Australia’s broader strategic environment — it simply was not previously viewed as a major security player.
As the United States becomes less predictable, Australia may need to consider deeper military and technological cooperation with Europe.
Australia is, in many ways, a geographically isolated country. Compared with Europe or Asia, Australians have historically faced fewer direct military threats, resulting in less public focus on defence and security issues.
Geographical distance long provided a sense of safety.
But in the era of drones, cyber warfare, satellite surveillance and supply-chain competition, distance is becoming less meaningful.
Australia can no longer rely solely on geography for protection.
This means Australia may need to place greater emphasis on international cooperation, technological capability and regional diplomacy, rather than relying exclusively on traditional military alliances.
Defence industry and strategic resilience
Europe’s rearmament also highlights another lesson for Australia: defence is not only a military issue, but an industrial one.
Australia’s defence model has long relied heavily on foreign suppliers, with most major military platforms sourced from the United States or allied nations.
During periods of stable globalisation, this model appeared efficient. But in periods of geopolitical tension, supply chain disruption or regional conflict, dependence can quickly become vulnerability.
In wartime, countries prioritise their own needs. Shortages of missiles, semiconductors, rare earths, energy and critical components could leave Australia exposed.
The war in Ukraine has already demonstrated how even European countries struggled with ammunition shortages.
Australia’s most symbolic defence initiative in recent years has been the AUKUS nuclear submarine partnership.
The project reflects Australia’s strategic anxiety — a desire to establish stronger long-range deterrence capabilities in the Indo-Pacific.
But nuclear submarines remain primarily strategic tools with limited broader impact.
By contrast, Europe is increasingly focused on rebuilding domestic defence manufacturing and linking military spending with industrial development.
From drones and air defence systems to AI-based military technologies, Europe is shifting toward a more flexible, technologically advanced and decentralised defence model.
Such an approach not only strengthens strategic autonomy, but also drives research, supply-chain integration and advanced manufacturing.
This remains an area where Australia still lags behind.
Multiculturalism and internal pressure
Australia’s multicultural structure also complicates the implications of global fragmentation.
As a highly immigrant-based society, Australia maintains deep cultural, economic and demographic links with many parts of the world.
Chinese, Middle Eastern, Indian and European communities all contribute to Australia’s diversity, which has long been considered one of the country’s strengths.
In the era of globalisation, multiculturalism enhanced Australia’s international connections and provided advantages in talent, language and diplomacy.
But as the world moves toward greater geopolitical confrontation, diversity may also create new pressures.
Political conflicts overseas increasingly spill into Australian society through protests, ethnic tensions, hate speech, disinformation and foreign influence campaigns.
This does not mean multiculturalism itself is a problem, but rather that Australia can no longer remain insulated from global conflicts as easily as it once could.
International crises are no longer distant diplomatic issues — they increasingly affect domestic politics, public sentiment and national security.
Future security challenges may therefore involve not only military threats, but also the ability to maintain social cohesion, openness and democratic values in a fragmented world.
The more unstable the international environment becomes, the harder it is for Australia to remain detached from it.
A fragmenting world
The world is shifting from unipolarity toward multipolar competition, from outsourced security toward strategic autonomy, and from traditional military power toward technologically driven warfare.
The era defined by American dominance, globalisation, low conflict and low militarisation is gradually fading.
In its place is emerging a more unstable world shaped by supply chains, strategic competition and geopolitical rivalry.
For Australia, this is not simply a trend to observe, but a reality that must be confronted.
As old security structures become less stable, the central question for Australia is no longer simply “which side to stand on”, but how to build resilience and capability amid uncertainty.
That includes reconsidering relations with the United States, Britain and Europe, while also rethinking the connections between defence, technology, energy and industry.
Future security competition may ultimately depend less on military strength alone and more on overall national capability.
The world is changing — and the pace of change may be faster than governments can adapt.
The question has never been whether change will come, but how many countries will be prepared once the old order truly ends.
