The Hong Kong government is proposing amendments to subsidiary legislation under the Safeguarding National Security Ordinance to further expand the scope of national security laws. Under the latest proposal, even if an offence is not explicitly listed as a national security crime under the Hong Kong National Security Law or the Safeguarding National Security Ordinance, the Chief Executive may issue a certificate declaring that the conduct involves national security. Once such certification is issued, the case can be treated as a national security case.

The government said the new mechanism is intended to establish an enforcement framework for so-called “other offences endangering national security” mentioned in existing legislation. After the Chief Executive issues a certificate, the relevant case would be handled under the national security legal framework across all stages, including investigation, arrest, prosecution, trial, and sentencing.

The Legislative Council’s Security Panel and Panel on Administration of Justice and Legal Services have held a joint meeting to discuss the proposal. The government plans to adopt a “negative vetting” approach, meaning the subsidiary legislation will take effect immediately upon gazettal and only be reviewed by the legislature afterwards.

Secretary for Security Chris Tang said the amendment does not expand the definition or penalties of national security offences, but rather clarifies the legal framework. He stressed that a case would only be confirmed as a national security case after the issuance of a certificate by the Chief Executive, and that defendants’ rights would not be affected.

However, the Hong Kong Human Rights Information Centre, a group of overseas Hong Kong legal professionals, raised strong concerns. It argued that the proposal grants the Chief Executive greater power to bring non-national security offences under the national security regime, with decisions difficult to challenge through judicial review.

Human rights groups warned that the move could further weaken judicial independence and defendants’ rights, while broadening the scope of national security law applications. They noted that national security cases already involve designated judges, higher bail thresholds, and special procedures, and the new changes could extend such restrictions to more cases.

Commentary:

The key issue in the amendment is the expansion of executive discretion in determining what constitutes a national security case, without clearly defined legal thresholds. As the boundary of national security becomes increasingly broad, it becomes harder for the public to predict which actions may fall within its scope, raising concerns about legal certainty and public confidence.

The development also suggests Hong Kong’s national security framework is gradually moving closer to the mainland Chinese model, where “national security” is a broad and flexible concept covering political, economic, technological, cultural, and information domains. Law enforcement authorities there also enjoy wider interpretative discretion. The introduction of this subsidiary legislation mechanism in Hong Kong signals a continued convergence of the two systems.

The US Department of Defense has released its latest “1260H military companies list,” adding major Chinese firms including Alibaba, BYD and Baidu. The US alleges that these companies are either linked to or assisting the Chinese military, or have ties to China’s military-industrial complex. Analysts say the move could further intensify tensions between the US and China in technology and trade.

According to a notice published in the Federal Register, the updated list also includes dozens of other Chinese companies across a wide range of sectors, such as pharmaceutical company WuXi AppTec, electric vehicle maker NIO, LiDAR firms Hesai Technology and RoboSense, battery producer CALB, chipmakers CXMT and YMTC, and robotics firm Unitree. The update also removed 10 entities from the list.

With this revision, China’s three major tech giants — Alibaba, Baidu and Tencent — are now all designated by Washington as entities supporting the Chinese military. Tencent was added last year, while BYD is the latest high-profile electric vehicle manufacturer to be included.

The Pentagon said companies are designated because they are suspected of directly or indirectly supporting the People’s Liberation Army through commercial services, manufacturing, production or export activities, meeting the definition of a “Chinese military company” under Section 1260H.

While inclusion on the list does not immediately trigger sanctions, restrictions have been tightening in recent years. Under existing legislation, the Pentagon will be prohibited from entering into direct contracts with listed companies later this month, and from 2027 will also be barred from purchasing their goods or services through third parties.

So far, many of the named companies have not publicly responded. China’s embassy in Washington has previously criticised such measures, urging the US to stop suppressing Chinese firms and to provide a fair, impartial and non-discriminatory business environment.

Commentary

The expansion of the list reflects how US–China competition has moved beyond trade into strategic sectors such as artificial intelligence, semiconductors, electric vehicles and new energy. Although listing does not immediately impose sanctions, it may pave the way for tighter investment screening, export controls and market restrictions in the future.

Beijing maintains that the companies are commercial entities and denies any special military ties. However, under Washington’s “de-risking” approach, the boundary between national security and civilian technology is becoming increasingly blurred, with many civilian innovations now viewed as potentially dual-use.

As strategic rivalry continues to intensify, further restrictions are likely. For Chinese firms, strengthening domestic R&D capacity and reducing reliance on foreign technology will increasingly become a key long-term challenge.

The “Future Combat Air System” (SCAF), a joint sixth-generation fighter jet programme led by France, Germany and Spain, has suffered a major setback. French President Emmanuel Macron and German Chancellor Friedrich Merz have agreed that the companies involved have failed to reach consensus on the project’s next phase, making continued joint development of the fighter increasingly difficult.

The SCAF is considered one of Europe’s largest defence cooperation projects. It was launched in 2017 by Macron and then-German Chancellor Angela Merkel, with Spain joining in 2019. The programme was originally intended to deliver a next-generation combat aircraft by 2040, replacing France’s Rafale and Germany and Spain’s Eurofighter Typhoon, while strengthening Europe’s strategic autonomy in defence.

However, the project has long been hampered by disputes over industrial leadership between France’s Dassault Aviation and Airbus, which represents German and Spanish interests. Dassault has insisted on leading the aircraft’s development, while Airbus has pushed for a more equal co-leadership model. The two sides have repeatedly failed to reach agreement.

The German government said Chancellor Merz has suggested halting the joint fighter development project. Nevertheless, both sides reportedly still hope to preserve other components of SCAF, including a networked combat system integrating fighter jets, drones and broader operational platforms. Discussions on a revised defence cooperation framework are expected at a France-Germany defence ministers’ meeting in July.

Commentary

As one of Europe’s most symbolically important defence cooperation projects, SCAF was designed around the idea of “strategic autonomy” — reducing reliance on US military technology while integrating the aerospace industries of France, Germany and Spain.

Its stagnation highlights the structural difficulties of European defence integration. National security priorities and the protection of domestic defence industries continue to outweigh collective strategic goals. Even amid the security pressures created by the Russia–Ukraine war, European countries remain reluctant to surrender control in high-end military technologies.

In the short term, the deadlock may slow Europe’s progress in developing future air combat systems and deepen its reliance on the United States and NATO frameworks. In the long run, unless Europe can establish a coherent mechanism for cooperation in core defence technologies, “strategic autonomy” risks remaining more a political slogan than an achievable reality.