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Identity of Chinese Australians

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Article/Blessing CALD Editorial;Photo/Internet

14 mins audio

 

Chinese people seldom think about activities in their community that may affect their identity as Australians.

 

Building a Successful Shed

The feature in Issue 703 of Sameway Magazine talks about the Sheikh of Dubai incident in Hong Kong. Today, all information about the Sheikh has disappeared from the websites of various organizations in Hong Kong, and almost no one is talking about him, as if he has never existed. I believe that the chances of the Sheikh coming to Hong Kong before the end of May to continue with his investment promises are already very slim. In the feature, I have also mentioned that His Holiness Pema Osei (Dato’ Ng Tat Yung, now renamed as Prof. Ng Kong Ho) has become a world leader in 2013 by building a stage for him with the Melbourne expatriates. His Holiness is described on the official website of his foundation as “an internationally recognized philanthropist, public diplomat, inventor and spiritual teacher”. His role as a “public diplomat” is one that I have wondered about over the years, what exactly does he do? Recently, I have been looking up some websites related to His Holiness, and I found some clues that Chinese Australians should pay attention to.

Since 2013, His Holiness has gained the support and recognition of various major Chinese community associations in Melbourne. His World Trade United Foundation has organized ten “Global Forums on Water Sustainability”, of which the sixth (2014) and the tenth (2018) were both held in Melbourne. The Foundation’s website still maintains a record of the events since 2013, and many Melbourne leaders have been recognized as executives of the organization over the years, so you only need to spend a little time to see how Melbourne leaders have stood up for him over the years.

I attended one of these forums and recognized that it was not an academic conference, just a dinner. With only invited guests delivering speeches and awards being presented to the various delegates in attendance, it could be described as a showcase for the collaborative relationships that members of His Holiness’s team have forged. At the 2018 Forum, I was surprised to learn that, in addition to Melbourne’s Chinese Consul, Victoria’s MP, and the second generation of China’s military, there were at least 15 dignitaries, such as ambassadors and ministers, from other countries, who were honored with awards. What on earth were these delegates doing in Melbourne, traveling all the way from overseas to participate in the Forum, just for this one dinner? The guests of honor at that time included the head of the Ministry of United Front Work of the Chinese government, and as shown in the photos on the event website, there were H.E. Tapusalaia Toomata, the then Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Samoan Independent State in China, H.E. Tau’aika ‘Uta’atu, the Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Kingdom of Tonga in China, and H.E. Carlson D. Apis, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Federated States of Micronesia to China.

These ambassadors were all high ranking officials of the Pacific Islands at the time, and they came to Melbourne to discuss diplomatic matters, and His Holiness really deserved the title of “public diplomat”. I do not know how the Australian government, which has been ridiculed by the Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi for treating the Pacific Islands as its backyard, can understand how these diplomatic activities of gathering dignitaries in Melbourne through the activities of the Chinese community and making contacts with world leaders could have developed into the present-day situation that affects and threatens Australia’s security, and which has caused the Foreign Minister, Penny Wong, to be tired of running for her life, so much so that she has to make repeated visits to Pacific Islands to prevent the entry of Chinese forces into Australia’s backyard. I do not know even more. I wonder if the local Chinese leaders who supported, planned, organized and promoted these activities at that time feel that they have done something that threatens Australia’s security today.

The fact that many of the Pacific Island countries are now working closely with China and distancing themselves from Australia shows that His Holiness’s activities in Australia over the past decade or so have clearly paid off, and it is no wonder that His Holiness is still active around the world today, continuing his career as a “public diplomat”.

 

The Role of Chinese Leaders

Judging from today’s results, what the Chinese community leaders were promoting at that time could not be simply described as community activities. If the Australian Security and Intelligence Office (ASIO) had looked into these activities and investigated the Chinese leaders who promoted them, it is not sure whether the actions of some of them might have been considered as “endangering Australia’s national security”. What is certain, however, is that if the same events were to be held in Melbourne today, the enthusiasm of the Chinese leaders for the events might not be the same as before. At least some Australian politicians have disavowed their involvement with similar organizations following the enactment of Australia’s Anti-Foreign Intervention Act in 2018. However, on His Holiness’s website, today I still find the names and photos of Melbourne Chinese leaders listed as leaders of the Foundation in the 2021 records.

I once found the name of a Chinese leader whom I respect listed there, and when I asked him about it, he told me he had no idea about it. It turns out that the names listed may not necessarily be agreed and recognized by the person concerned, and anyway, if the person concerned does not know about it and there is no way to pursue the matter, then the person who has done this will have passed the test. But today, the problem may become serious. I believe that Chinese leaders should be more vigilant and should not be exploited.

Recently, His Holiness has been active as Prof. Wu Ganghao in the promotion of meta-universe, which is a hot topic in the science and technology sector. He has become the executive chairman of the “Global Meta-Universe Conference”, and he continues to promote his “diplomacy” activities around the world. If His Holiness comes back to Australia one day, will the Chinese leaders continue to carry his sedan chair for him?

 

The Myth of Chinese Identity

It is rare for Chinese people to think of their activities in the community as having an impact on their identity as Australians. Chinese people in their 70s and 80s came to Australia around the end of the Second World War. Many of them came from Guangdong because their fathers and grandfathers had already settled in Australia. When they came to Australia, China and Australia had not yet established diplomatic relations, and they were not yet sure whether they were nationals of the Republic of China (ROC) or the People’s Republic of China (PRC). They only saw that their own culture was different from that of the Australian society, and they had a strong feeling that they were expatriates without a country. They may think that one day they will return to their homeland, but politically they only hope for peace and unification of China. Therefore, unifying the Chinese to protect themselves from bullying in Australia became the goal and main function of the society. These Chinese leaders hoped to see the unification and China being strong, and seldom thought about what kind of Australians they should be.

However, most of the Chinese who came to settle in Australia after the 1970s are no longer related to the Chinese of the Gold Rush era. They are more likely to be Chinese from the Commonwealth countries who have left to study and become professionals in Australia. They have a certain status and professional identity in the society, and they recognize themselves as Australians, and do not necessarily participate in the activities of Chinese societies. However, most of them still have contact and relationship with the Chinese community, but they do not have much influence in the Chinese community.

In the 80’s and 90’s, some Chinese from Hong Kong set up a number of social or service organizations, which provided a lot of services to the Chinese community. They seldom talked about their home country and their identity, but only wanted to serve the Chinese in the community, and they did not take the initiative to establish a close relationship with the Chinese government. However, the Chinese who came from China in the early 1990s, although they stayed behind because of the June 4 incident, worked hard to establish cooperation with China, and took advantage of China’s economic development to build their own businesses in Australia. Many of today’s Chinese business and community leaders are successful expatriates who have capitalized on their relationship with China and combined it with business in Australia. However, these people have stayed in Australia for more than 30 years and are no longer able to connect with China today in terms of life and thinking, forming the backbone of today’s Chinese community.

Many of the immigrants who came after 2000 were middle-aged people who uprooted themselves to rebuild their lives in China, either by becoming students or by having established careers in China. They grew up in China and were influenced by their patriotic education, but did not analyze in depth the phenomena caused by the rise of China in the global West. They are enjoying the opportunities given to them by China, and they like the life and freedom in Australia, but they do not want to integrate into this society. For them, they like being Australian and enjoy being Chinese.

When the relationship between Australia and China is harmonious, they feel that they have a lot of opportunities and that the Australian society gives them a lot of possibilities. However, when the relationship between Australia and China is tense, they feel that they don’t know whether to go back to China or to Australia, and some of them are caught in a dilemma. Some of them are caught in the dilemma of whether to stay in Australia or go back to China. As they are financially and educationally well-off, they are also easily caught in the dilemma of choosing between the two.

Due to China’s one-child policy, there is a group of retired migrants in Australia who migrate to Australia because of their children. There are quite a number of them, they are financially well off and have a successful career, but they don’t know English and don’t know much about the western social system. However, they have a lot of experience and connections in China, so as long as their age and health are still good, they can have a period of time to create their own new life in Australia. For these people, the ability to identify and decide their future identity and role earlier will open up new horizons for their future.

 

Mr. Raymond Chow

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What Is the Significance of Victorian Premier Jacinta Allan’s First Visit to China?

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Victorian Premier Jacinta Allan embarked on her first visit to China since taking office, from September 14 to 19, lasting five days. Her itinerary included Beijing, Shanghai, as well as Victoria’s sister cities Nanjing, Chengdu, and Deyang. Accompanied by Labor MPs, she met with Chinese officials and business leaders. The focus was on boosting trade, promoting education exchanges, expanding the tourism market, and attracting more Chinese students and investment, with the aim of raising Victoria’s profile in China.

 

Is Victoria’s Relationship with China Over?

 

China has long been Victoria’s largest trading partner and the main source of international visitors. Allan’s office framed this trip as “the beginning of a new golden era” and emphasized that the purpose was to rebuild friendship with China.

 

Looking back, former premier Daniel Andrews had strongly promoted cooperation with China and even signed the “Belt and Road” agreement in 2018. However, the federal government later exercised its power under the Foreign Arrangements Scheme Act for the first time, canceling two agreements Victoria signed with China, citing inconsistency with Australia’s foreign policy or harm to foreign relations. This move provoked strong dissatisfaction from Beijing, with China’s Foreign Ministry harshly criticizing Australia for having “no sincerity in improving China–Australia relations.”

 

Subsequently, relations between China and Australia deteriorated further due to multiple controversies. Australia criticized Beijing’s actions regarding Hong Kong protests and human rights issues in Xinjiang, and supported the World Health Organization’s independent investigation into the COVID-19 outbreak. Meanwhile, Australian intelligence agencies exposed China’s attempts to influence local politics through political donations, sparking national security concerns. These events further strained bilateral ties.

 

Even so, Victoria tried to maintain exchanges with China, establishing sister-city relationships with several Chinese cities and consolidating ties through education and business cooperation, attempting to preserve collaboration within an otherwise tense climate.

 

But compared with Andrews’ “pro-China” image, Allan faces a more delicate situation. After stepping down two years ago, Andrews turned to private business, becoming a consultant with close links to Chinese enterprises. More recently, he even appeared at a military parade in Tiananmen Square and was photographed with President Xi Jinping and other Chinese leaders, sparking controversy. As the current premier, Allan has said, “”Victoria is an old friend of China and these connections are so valuable for our state,” but she must strike a far more cautious balance between cooperation with China and domestic political sentiment.

 

Judging by the arrangements of this visit, China’s reception of Allan was clearly not on par with that of Andrews in the past. She only met with Minister of Education Huai Jinpeng, and her first policy speech was held merely at a hotel. This treatment was far less prestigious than Andrews’ high-level invitation to witness the Tiananmen parade just a week earlier. Observers speculate that Beijing attaches limited importance to the current Victorian government, possibly because the “Belt and Road” agreements were overturned by the federal government, or due to the broader backdrop of strained China–Australia relations.

 

The Contradictions of Education Diplomacy

 

One major highlight of this trip was to deepen education cooperation. In its newly released Victoria’s China Strategy: For a New Golden Era, the Victorian government pointed out that in 2024 the international education industry contributed as much as AUD 15.9 billion to the state’s economy, remaining Victoria’s largest service export for more than two decades. Among this, Chinese students numbered 64,000, making China the largest source country. The document listed “continue to strengthen our reputation as a preferred destination for Chinese visitors, students, researchers, and investors” as a strategic priority, emphasizing the need to further consolidate Victoria’s image as a global destination for Chinese tourists, students, researchers, and investors.

 

When meeting Chinese Education Minister Huai Jinpeng in Beijing, Allan repeatedly stressed Victoria’s welcoming attitude toward Chinese students, hoping to expand bilateral exchanges through stronger educational cooperation and demonstrating the importance she attaches to “education diplomacy.”

 

However, this proactive approach sharply contrasts with federal policy. In August 2025, the Australian federal government announced a new student quota system, capping the total number of international students nationwide at 295,000 in 2026. Although this figure was 25,000 higher than the current year, industry insiders believe that due to persistent restrictions in the immigration system, actual numbers are unlikely to reach the cap. This runs counter to Victoria’s slogan of “saying yes to international students,” revealing a clear policy gap between the state and federal levels.

 

Under this contradictory framework, Victoria’s efforts to deepen cooperation with China through education remain constrained by federal policy, making it difficult for the state to achieve significant breakthroughs on its own. With the failed Belt and Road experience still fresh, it is understandable why Beijing did not devote much attention to the current premier. Against this backdrop, Allan could only meet with China’s education minister, raising doubts about how much real progress could be made.

 

Underwhelming Economic and Trade Outcomes

 

Just as politics offered little warmth, business results also proved lackluster. Many expected one of Allan’s key goals would be to seek Chinese funding for the Suburban Rail Loop (SRL) project, which faces a massive AUD 34 billion funding shortfall. This expectation was heightened by the fact that the rail line runs through electorates represented by several members of the delegation.

 

Yet, only a handful of business meetings were reported, with few major corporations participating. The visible results amounted to just two announcements: a solar energy cooperation project at the beginning of the trip, and at the end, the purchase of four tunnel boring machines (TBMs) from Chinese manufacturers for the SRL project.

 

The former was limited in scale and faced local criticism—during construction the project would create only about 60 temporary jobs, and after completion just six permanent positions, with minimal local employment benefits and potential environmental impacts.

 

The latter, although Allan made a point of visiting tunnel works in Deyang, Sichuan, and staged photo opportunities to emphasize Victoria’s cooperation with China, was essentially “spending money on imports.” While buying Chinese TBMs secured equipment for the SRL, it raised questions: why not develop or support such technology domestically, creating local jobs and industries, instead of sending huge sums abroad?

 

In other words, these arrangements mostly involved one-way capital outflow, without bringing in real foreign investment or capital inflows. The outcomes fell short of expectations for “attracting Chinese investment,” leaving only purchases and symbolic cooperation. With political recognition lacking and economic results unimpressive, what substantive benefits did this trip actually deliver for Victoria’s economy?

 

Economic Diplomacy or Electioneering?

 

For Allan, the trip was something of a dilemma. As premier, she could not avoid going to China during her term. But at the same time, she surely knew it would be hard to achieve real breakthroughs. The result was like a salesman being ignored despite enthusiasm, or a poor relative knocking on doors only to be turned away. Why, then, did Allan still lead a high-profile delegation to China?

 

Funded by taxpayers at an estimated cost of several hundred thousand dollars, the delegation did not include a single minister—only MPs from electorates with large Chinese or multicultural populations. They included Parliamentary Secretary and Box Hill MP Paul Hamer, and four Labor backbenchers: Meng Heang Tak (Clarinda), Mathew Hilakari (Point Cook), Matt Fregon (Ashwood), and John Mullahy (Glen Waverley).

 

According to the 2021 census, Victoria has around 500,000 residents of Chinese descent, a significant share of the state’s 7 million population. In these key electorates, Chinese voters number in the tens of thousands, enough to influence electoral outcomes. While these accompanying MPs may have little policy influence, they are politically important. This raises questions over whether Allan’s visit was more about connecting with the Chinese community ahead of the November 2026 state election, consolidating a large and crucial voter bloc. Rather than an economic diplomacy mission, it may have been a campaign-style political tour.

 

The trip delivered limited results, with symbolism outweighing substance. Allan brought back no new investment and no major corporate commitments, while her accompanying MPs became the focus. What can these powerless backbenchers actually bring to Victoria? Do they signal attention to multicultural communities and bolster diplomatic credentials? Or was this merely a “taxpayer-funded election show,” with taxpayer money spent on photo ops in China to build momentum for the next election? Anyone with a bit of political sense can see through it.

 

Multicultural Development

 

Just before the trip, the Victorian government released the Victoria’s Multicultural Review, regarded as the most significant policy reform in decades. Led by George Lekakis AO and an expert advisory group, it drew on 57 community meetings, consultations with over 640 residents, and input from more than 150 organizations and community groups. The goal was to strengthen social cohesion and rebuild trust between the government and multicultural communities. The report was released on September 11 by Allan and Minister for Multicultural Affairs Ingrid Stitt.

 

Core recommendations include establishing a new statutory agency, Multicultural Victoria, headed by a Multicultural Coordinator General, supported by two deputies (one from a rural area), and advised by a five-member commissioner panel. This structure would replace the largely ceremonial Victorian Multicultural Commission (VMC), which for years was limited to public relations without significant policy impact.

 

Following the review’s release, Allan quickly linked “multiculturalism” with the Chinese community. On September 12, in her hometown Bendigo, she announced nearly AUD 400,000 in funding to upgrade the Golden Dragon Museum into the “National Chinese Museum of Australia.” This symbolic move not only highlighted Bendigo’s historical ties to Chinese immigrants during the gold rush but also aimed to strengthen the cultural status of the Chinese community in Victoria.

 

Other funded projects included the Mingyue Buddhist Temple in Springvale South, the Avalokiteshvara Yuan Tong Monastery underground car park in Deer Park, the Museum of Chinese Australian History in Melbourne CBD, and infrastructure and lighting upgrades at the Chinese Association of Victoria Inc in Wantirna. These investments enhance cultural facilities and directly address community needs.

 

Is Multiculturalism a Political Tool or Genuine Goal?

 

This raises the question: are Allan’s initiatives genuinely aimed at fostering social cohesion, or are they part of political calculation? Victoria has long led the country in multicultural policy, but its political functions are also significant. During Andrews’ era, “multiculturalism” was used to package economic cooperation with China, drawing criticism of “national security risks” and “overdependence.” Allan now continues this approach but faces cool responses from Beijing and skepticism from the opposition and media at home.

 

Still, Allan’s strategy is not identical to Andrews’. Unlike the 2016 version of the “China Strategy,” her policy no longer emphasizes export figures or the economic benefits of the Belt and Road, but instead focuses more on cultural exchange and community engagement, encouraging Chinese-Australians to actively shape interactions with China. This shift highlights interpersonal and cultural connections rather than purely commercial transactions.

 

She has repeatedly wrapped her policies in “personal stories”: from Beijing to Nanjing to Shanghai, she promoted not just Victoria’s universities, tourism, and agricultural products, but also the importance of shared history, language, and culture. When meeting Education Minister Huai Jinpeng, she mentioned that her 13-year-old daughter is learning Chinese, to foster relatability.

 

Thus, Allan’s “multicultural strategy” carries two possible meanings: on one hand, it shows a sincere wish to improve social cohesion and strengthen ties with the Chinese community; on the other hand, it inevitably serves political calculation and election mobilization. As the 2026 state election approaches, Allan’s ability to convince both the Chinese community and the broader electorate that this is more than just political maneuvering but a genuine social vision will be a critical test of her leadership.

 

Still Unresolved: Practical Needs of Multicultural Communities

 

Even if Allan today offers small grants or gestures of goodwill toward the Chinese community, they pale in comparison to Andrews’ campaign promises in 2014 and 2018, when he pledged nearly AUD 20 million for the Chinese and Indian communities to purchase land for building aged care facilities. These two groups are now Victoria’s largest multicultural communities, and both place high cultural importance on caring for elders. Whether the elderly receive proper care in later life is a vital issue.

 

In 2018, the Australian government noted that as people live longer, the number of dementia patients is surging. For non-English-speaking elderly migrants—many of whom either never learned English or lose it due to dementia—the need for care in their native language and cultural context is especially acute. Yet mainstream services remain unwilling to provide such care. Therefore, the government has a responsibility to help minority communities build appropriate aged care facilities. Andrews recognized this situation and made it a campaign pledge.

 

But to this day, the Victorian government has only “purchased” the land and has not handed it over to community groups to build facilities—an 11-year failure that could be seen as the biggest “betrayal” of minority communities in Victorian history. By appealing to immigrant communities that value elder care, Andrews gained their votes to govern Victoria, but apparently never intended to deliver on his promises. It was a shameless act. Yet after Allan took over, she did not address the issue. Worse, last year she changed project rules, stripping Chinese and Indian community organizations of eligibility to apply to build aged care homes.

 

Clearly, the Allan government’s actions today sharply contradict its rhetoric about promoting multicultural development. This is likely to become a key concern for multicultural community voters in next year’s state election.

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From Everyday Pressure to Identity Anxiety: The Social Fault Lines Behind Anti-Immigration Marches

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On August 31, major Australian cities, including Sydney, Melbourne, Brisbane, Canberra, Adelaide, Hobart, and Perth, simultaneously saw anti-immigration demonstrations under the banner “The March For Australia.”

The organizers rallied around the slogan “Oppose Mass Immigration”, claiming that immigrants were crowding housing and economic resources. In Melbourne, about 1,000 people participated, while Sydney saw a much larger turnout of 5,000 to 8,000 people. Marchers waved Australian flags, chanted “Australia”, and some shouted exclusionary slogans like “Go back” and “Stop the invasion.”

For newly arrived immigrants—or even residents who have already settled—such scenes were not only confusing but also alienating. Prime Minister Anthony Albanese pointed out in an interview that apart from Indigenous Australians, all Australians are either immigrants or descendants of immigrants. Australia’s history is rooted in Indigenous culture for tens of thousands of years, while large-scale European colonization has profoundly shaped modern Australian society. In other words, many of the demonstrators themselves may be descendants of immigrants—so why do they hold such strong anti-immigrant sentiments?

Anti-Immigration Marches Driven by Far-Right Ideology

The “March For Australia” was partly triggered by the “March for Humanity” pro-Palestinian demonstrations on August 3. On that day, Sydney saw 200,000–300,000 participants, with similar rallies in other cities. The marches were marked by Palestinian flags, some waving Hamas banners, and even portraits of Iran’s Supreme Leader Khamenei. These scenes stoked anxiety among some citizens about “foreign immigrants,” setting the stage for the anti-immigration march.

The organizers of “March For Australia” identified themselves as “patriots” or “ordinary Australians,” advocating against “mass immigration” and for the protection of national culture and identity. They heavily promoted the event on social media platforms like TikTok, X, and Facebook, emphasizing “only wave the Australian flag, no foreign flags” and using “Defend Australian values” as a slogan.

However, the march quickly drew criticism from the government and public opinion as “spreading hatred and dividing society.” One reason is the organizers’ links to far-right forces. According to the ABC, their website once cited the far-right white nationalist concept of “remigration”—calling for the large-scale deportation of non-European immigrants—and even featured pro-Nazi and Hitler memes. Although later removed, this suggested underlying far-right tendencies.

Controversy deepened with the public involvement of the neo-Nazi group National Socialist Network (NSN), which promotes white supremacy and anti-Semitism and openly idolizes Hitler. While organizers claimed they were only encouraging various groups to participate, NSN rhetoric and online platforms were easily co-opted by neo-Nazis and racists. On the day of the march, some NSN members shouted “Australia is for white people” and stormed Melbourne’s “Camp Sovereignty,” a symbolic Indigenous protest site, trampling flags and extinguishing sacred fires, accompanied by blatant racist slogans. This led mainstream media to label the march as far-right or even fascist.

A glaring contradiction arose: if the march’s core concern was social pressure from too many immigrants, why did some participants target Indigenous Australians and ethnic minorities? What could have been a debate on immigration policy turned into a stage for neo-Nazis exploiting social anxieties to promote white supremacy.

Moreover, the anti-immigration marches, under the guise of “patriotism,” unwittingly made some participants tools of neo-Nazi propaganda. For extremist groups, the immigration issue is just the easiest emotional lever; their true goal is to incite racial hatred and further divide society.

The Complexity of Participants’ Motives

The crowd was not monolithic. Besides hardline nationalists, there were residents genuinely concerned about the cost of living, including long-settled immigrants. In Sydney, when a speaker emphasized that “defending culture and lifestyle is not hatred,” the crowd cheered. But when a self-proclaimed “Australian white” leader called for a “new wave of nationalism,” some immediately voiced disapproval, shouting “This is hate speech!” and many left early. This demonstrates that even under the same “patriotism” slogan, legitimate grievances and extremist ideology coexist—highlighting the deep divisions within Australian society.

Notably, some first-generation immigrants participated in the anti-immigration march. They often distinguished between “low-skilled” or “illegal” migrants, whom they claimed could not integrate into Australian society, versus high-skilled or wealthy immigrants, whom they welcomed. This selective standard reveals hypocrisy: criticizing vulnerable groups from a position of relative advantage is still a form of xenophobia, and essentially, hate.

Perceptions vs. Reality of Immigration in Australia

Concerns over “mass immigration” were amplified during the “March For Australia”. Organizers emphasized worries over housing and economic resources but never clearly defined what “mass immigration” means. Australia has always been a nation of immigrants, and the perception of “too many immigrants” may not align with reality.

Data shows immigration has not continuously surged. According to the 2021 census, there were about 550,000 residents born in China, a 72% increase over a decade—but growth slowed to just 8% in the past five years. The Muslim population rose 70% between 2011 and 2021, but only from 2.2% to 3.2% of the total population. These groups remain a minority nationally, though their concentration in Sydney and Melbourne amplifies social perceptions.

The pandemic also played a role. Border closures temporarily reduced the number of international students and immigrants, but once borders reopened, net overseas migration (NOM) spiked to 340,000, mostly concentrated in Melbourne and Sydney. This compounded housing shortages and rising living costs, fueling social anxiety.

The Lowy Institute’s June 2025 national survey found that 53% of Australians believed immigration levels were “too high,” up 5% from the previous year; 38% saw it as “appropriate,” and only 7% said “too low.” Anxiety about “too many immigrants” is real—but the root issue may lie in chronic shortages of housing and infrastructure.

Population Growth and Pressure on Social Resources

According to the Australian Bureau of Statistics, net migration reached 446,000 in the year to June 2024, including 207,000 international students mostly on temporary visas. This population inflow strains public healthcare, education, transport, and social services: emergency wait times rise, classrooms are overcrowded, and public transport becomes congested. These pressures fuel public concern and skepticism of government planning.

However, the problem isn’t simply “too many immigrants,” but the gap between population growth and infrastructure planning. During the pandemic, net migration fell below zero, yet housing prices continued to soar, and healthcare and education systems remained under pressure. The post-pandemic rebound pushed net migration above 500,000 in 2023, largely from returning students and temporary workers. The challenge is whether government planning and investment can keep pace with population change.

Following the anti-immigration protests, the federal government announced on September 2 that the 2025–26 permanent migration program would maintain 185,000 spots, focusing on skilled migrants and family reunification. To “manage student numbers more sustainably,” the international student cap will rise to 295,000 in 2026.

From July 1, 2024, the government ended the 485 visa extension policy: bachelor’s and master’s graduates can stay a maximum of 2 years, research masters and PhDs up to 3 years. English proficiency requirements and visa fees increased. Previously, many 485 visa holders could extend automatically, even without permanent residency prospects, swelling the temporary resident population. Many worked low-skilled, low-wage jobs, further stressing social resources and labor markets.

The Labor government is gradually addressing these issues to better align immigration levels with resources. If measures succeed, gaps between population growth and social infrastructure could ease.

The Role and Contribution of Immigrants

Three common complaints about immigrants are: they depress wages, take jobs from locals, and drive up housing prices. While simple and catchy, these claims do not hold up to scrutiny.

Immigrants support key sectors in Australia. Healthcare has long faced labor shortages; international medical staff fill gaps. Technology, engineering, and IT sectors rely on overseas graduates for skills and innovation. Immigrant entrepreneurship creates jobs, benefiting locals and other migrants, fueling economic growth. Immigrants often sustain employment markets rather than “steal jobs.”

New migrants do face challenges, including language barriers, cultural adjustment, and job competition. Attributing employment pressure solely to immigrants ignores the difficulties they endure.

Regarding housing, data shows that during the pandemic, when immigration was at a century-low, house prices still soared—indicating that low interest rates, investment demand, land shortages, and rising construction costs were the main drivers. Population growth contributes to demand but is not the primary cause of high prices.

Anti-Immigration Sentiment and Australia’s Challenge

Immigration policy in Australia is both an economic necessity and a sensitive social issue. The anti-immigration marches exposed this tension: peace and violence, legitimate concerns and extremist ideology coexist.

As Federal Minister for Multicultural Affairs Anne Aly noted, far-right and neo-Nazi groups exploit real anxieties about housing and cost of living to spread hatred and xenophobia. Historically, blaming immigrants for housing and infrastructure issues has precedents—without clarification, such tendencies risk repeating.

The government also bears responsibility. Immigrants from diverse backgrounds have long been part of society, and associated issues are not new. Overreliance on specific source countries, inadequate regulation of international students staying on temporary visas, and lack of systemic planning for third-country immigrants are policy gaps. These delays turn structural problems into simplified “immigration issues,” which extremists exploit. Without improving resource allocation and planning, anti-immigration sentiment will deepen societal division.

In the long term, Australia’s true challenge is not simply “too many immigrants,” but balancing population pressure with multicultural integration. The historical White Australia Policy left a deep xenophobic imprint. Today, the government must strengthen housing and infrastructure planning and promote education and multicultural understanding to genuinely achieve the ideal of a diverse, inclusive Australian society.

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“Medisafe” Award Sparks Controversy; Debate Lasts Several Months

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Medisafe, developed by Pan Xichun, daughter of international liver cancer expert and honorary professor of surgery at the University of Hong Kong Pan Dongping, has participated in multiple major Hong Kong and international innovation competitions and won awards. However, it was challenged by Hailey Cheng, a second-year student in Computational Mathematics at City University of Hong Kong, who questioned the originality of the project, suggesting that Pan commissioned an AI company to develop Medisafe and entered it into competitions. This sparked months of controversy over “ethics and authorship.” Recently, Pan Dongping and his wife Peng Yongzhi issued a statement expressing willingness to relinquish Medisafe’s awards, though it remains unclear if this will temporarily end the months-long storm.

A Talented Young Student

Last year, Pan Xichun, a first-year student at the prestigious Saint Paul’s Co-educational College (SPCC) in Hong Kong, won numerous local and international awards for her AI project Medisafe. She received the Hong Kong ICT Award: Student Innovation Award, the Jury’s Special Commendation, and returned with honors from the Geneva International Invention Exhibition, earning media recognition as a “prodigy” and “future star of AI in healthcare.”

Medisafe is an AI-driven web application designed to assist hospitals and clinics in processing large volumes of prescriptions and connecting different medical departments, providing cross-hospital AI-assisted services for patients. The system cross-checks medications and patient databases to automatically verify allergies, long-term medications, and clinical conditions. It alerts medical staff if potential prescription or dosage issues are detected. In interviews after winning awards in April, Pan Xichun stated that the idea for Medisafe arose from news about medication errors. She emphasized that no similar system exists on the market that automatically compares prescriptions with patient medical records, claiming Medisafe as a first-of-its-kind concept.

Pan Xichun’s broader talents also highlight her capabilities: at 13, she founded a volunteer organization serving the community and earned recognition for musical talents. Previously, she created a system linking smart insoles to a mobile app to monitor hikers’ conditions and issue alerts, demonstrating creativity. Her outstanding performance from a young age is likely influenced by her family background, as her parents are established social elites.

Traditional Chinese educational philosophy stresses the role of parents and teachers as cultivators: “If a child is raised without proper teaching, it is the parent’s fault; if the teaching is not strict, it is the teacher’s laziness.” Pan Xichun’s early talents suggest her parents invested considerable effort in nurturing her abilities. From this perspective, it is hard to see why Pan Xichun’s parents should face criticism.

From Winning Awards to “Ethics Controversy”

The situation shifted quickly. On June 13, Hailey Cheng, a second-year student in computational mathematics at City University of Hong Kong and an undergraduate researcher in computational biology, posted on Threads questioning whether the project was solely Pan’s work. She also raised concerns about potential patient data leakage to third parties, citing privacy risks. This drew public attention: logging into Medisafe directed users to the AI Health Studio (AIHS) website, indicating clients included Pan Dongping and his brother Pan Dongsong’s Hong Kong Hepatopancreatobiliary and Colorectal Minimally Invasive Surgery Center. Subsequently, Medisafe became inaccessible.

As the controversy grew, AIHS co-founders issued a statement clarifying that in March of the previous year, they had been commissioned by Pan Dongping’s wife, Peng Yongzhi, to produce a Minimum Viable Product (MVP) for Medisafe. They emphasized the product was developed from scratch, with Pan Xichun providing only the initial idea, and that they were never informed it would be submitted to competitions.

Concerns arose over why an American AI company was hired. Peng Yongzhi explained that to prevent the concept from being copied or commercialized by others, she independently contacted the company in March of last year to explore developing a commercially viable product. In the same month, they were commissioned to develop the MVP for business feasibility verification. Competition organizers stress that entries must be original concepts created in Hong Kong, with participants holding intellectual property rights or legal ownership, and requested a full investigation by the Hong Kong Education City and the Standard Assurance Committee. Hong Kong Gifted Education Academy and Education City later confirmed that the platform was an original concept and that all awards would be retained. Nonetheless, controversies continued.

The Elite Mindset: Winning is Everything

In Hong Kong, a highly market-driven education system combined with entrenched social stratification makes competition extraordinarily fierce from the start. Children must not only learn early but also rely on substantial resources. Parental social status determines access to elite education, financial strength secures top-tier teachers, and extensive networks help package résumés. Education has become a precision investment: money, time, and strategy are invested, with expected returns in connections, résumés, platforms, and academic advancement. The Medisafe controversy offers a glimpse into this reality.

On a broader social scale, the Medisafe incident exposes a deep fissure in Hong Kong’s educational system: in a “competition-first” and “résumé-driven” environment, education becomes a theater for packaging success. The controversy is less about a “fallen prodigy” and more about public disillusionment with the “elite replication mechanism”—where awards reflect parents’ resources, connections, and wealth. Whether Pan Xichun is truly a genius or whether her family’s resources propelled her beyond societal expectations is now a topic of public debate.

Parents Step In

Recently, Pan Dongping and his wife announced they would relinquish all awards associated with Medisafe, citing their daughter’s mental and physical well-being as the priority. They acknowledged shortcomings in handling the situation, apologized for the disruption, and reaffirmed that Medisafe was Pan Xichun’s original concept. They also reserved the right to pursue legal action against false claims and malicious attacks online. Their statement reflects a protective parental stance, though it also reveals an elite mindset perceiving the world as being against their daughter.

In recent years, more than 4,000 Hong Kong students have participated in STEM competitions. Some schools even coach students “to win awards,” outsourcing development or fabricating research. This highlights the disparities in resources among families and raises questions of educational fairness. Education has become a contest of family background, capital, and packaging skills. The question arises: should children’s early growth aim to cultivate independent thinkers, empathetic and responsible individuals, or to produce elite performers following their parents’ scripts?

The Long Road Ahead

The most unfortunate aspect is the impact on Pan Xichun herself. Legally still a minor, she was thrust into a public controversy amplified by online discourse—a situation far beyond what a student should endure.

Online, critics labeled her actions as “academic fraud” or “winning awards through financial resources,” largely based on subjective assumptions without factual basis. STEM competitions are designed to encourage creativity and effort, not to judge minors by strict academic standards. Many online critics likely have no personal involvement in such competitions, but sensationalism elevated their importance beyond reason.

Pan Xichun’s parents hope relinquishing the awards will calm the storm, citing her extreme distress from online bullying. Rumors suggest she may take a year off school. Her recovery from this mental strain will vary and may leave long-term impacts. It is regrettable if public emotional venting hinders the development of an exceptionally talented young person.

However, the parents also criticized Hailey Cheng, asserting she was not a “well-intentioned whistleblower.” In reality, whistleblowers aim to raise public awareness, and their motives need not be “good-willed.” Critiquing social mechanisms often prompts backlash, but this does not invalidate whistleblowing. Cheng consistently updated the situation online since June, reportedly facing online and real-world harassment, including anonymous threats, which is also unacceptable.

After Pan’s parents announced relinquishing the awards, Cheng noted that their decision was not due to competition rules or originality disputes but primarily to protect their daughter’s health, highlighting how formal mechanisms often fail while online discourse pressures change. This reflection raises questions: can evidence, rules, and facts truly drive investigations, or only public pressure and online debate? Elite families may perceive rules and evidence as tools to climb social ladders—until public scrutiny, particularly online, challenges their arrogance.

When competitions intended to promote innovation and discover young talent become contests of academic resources and connections, one must ask: how much space remains for ordinary children to advance? Family legacy requires generational continuity, but when social mechanisms reinforce inequality and disregard basic fairness, whistleblowing deserves attention.

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